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THE AMICUS MACHINE 
Allison Orr Larsen* & Neal Devins** 
The Supreme Court receives a record number of amicus curiae briefs 
and cites to them with increasing regularity. Amicus briefs have also be-
come influential in determining which cases the Court will hear. It thus 
becomes important to ask: Where do these briefs come from? The tradi-
tional tale describes amicus briefs as the product of interest-group lob-
bying. But that story is incomplete and outdated. Today, skilled and spe-
cialized advocates of the Supreme Court Bar strategize about what 
issues the Court should hear and from whom they should hear them. 
They then “wrangle” the necessary amici and “whisper” to coordinate 
the message. The result is orchestrated and intentional—the product of 
what we call “the amicus machine.” 
This Article has two goals: The first is to offer a new description of 
the origin of many Supreme Court amicus briefs, explaining how it is 
that the Justices and the advocates benefit from this choreographed 
amicus process. Second, we make the perhaps surprising claim that the 
amicus machine is normatively desirable. Others have warned about the 
influence of the powerful lawyers of the Supreme Court Bar generally. 
While acknowledging these risks, we argue that—when it comes to ami-
cus briefs—the benefits of specialization outweigh the costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
HE amicus machine has arrived. Ninety-eight percent of U.S. Su-
preme Court cases now have amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) 
filings; 800 briefs are filed each term with the marquee cases attracting 
briefs in the triple digits.1 This is over an 800% increase from the 1950s2 
and a 95% increase from 1995.3 The real surprise, however, is the story 
behind the scenes—a story that amplifies fundamental changes in both 
 
1 Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Record Breaking Term for Amicus Curiae in 
Supreme Court Reflects New Norm, Nat’l L.J., Aug. 19, 2015 (“In the 2014–15 term, 
‘friends of the court’ participated in 98 percent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s cases, filed 
nearly 800 amicus curiae briefs and broke two records: the most amicus briefs filed in a case 
and the most signatories on a single brief. . . . [W]e conclude that mountains of briefs, shat-
tered records and the justices’ reliance on amici simply reflect the new norm.”).  
2 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 749 (2000) (“While the number of cases that the 
Court has disposed of on the merits has not appreciably increased during this time (indeed it 
has fallen in recent years), the number of amicus filings has increased by more than 800%.”); 
see Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision 
Making 46 (2008); Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist 
Years, 89 Judicature 127, 128–29 (2005).  3 There were 400 amicus briefs filed in the 1995 Term, see Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lisa A. 
Solowiej, Interest Group Participation, Competition, and Conflict in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 955, 961 (2007), and 781 briefs filed in the 2014 Term, see Franze & 
Anderson, supra note 1. 
T
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lawyering before the Supreme Court and, more significantly, Supreme 
Court decision making. 
The dominant narrative of the amicus growth spurt to date is a story 
about interest-group lobbying: The “friends” responsible for amicus 
briefs are motivated interest groups that want to urge their policy posi-
tions on the Justices much like they lobby Congress.4 But this narrative 
is now outdated and incomplete. 
Even though the rise of amicus filings is partially linked to interest-
group activity,5 the real story in the growth and especially the influence 
of amicus filings is the dramatic spike in activity by the so-called Su-
preme Court Bar. Today, elite, top-notch lawyers help shape the Court’s 
docket by asking other elite lawyers to file amicus briefs requesting that 
the Court hear their case.6 When the Court grants certiorari (or “cert”), 
these very lawyers strategize about which voices the Court should hear 
 
4 Collins, supra note 2, at 27 (“[A]mici perform a function similar to that which lobbyists 
perform for legislations. That is, by informing the justices of the implications of their deci-
sions, amici enable justices to render decisions that both maximize the application of their 
policy preferences and allow them to create efficacious law.”); Omari Scott Simmons, Pick-
ing Friends From the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 
185, 192 (2009) (Amicus briefs “‘provide the judicial counterpart of lobbying’” and are a 
way for “interest groups to influence government decision making” (quoting Samuel Kris-
lov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L.J. 694, 717 
(1963))); see also Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons from 
Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 933, 939–40 (2015) 
(assessing patterns in congressional amicus filings over the past forty years). For a compre-
hensive history of the role of the amicus curiae, see Krislov, supra, at 694–704.  5 For example, on church-state issues, the rise in amicus filings is undoubtedly tied to the 
proliferation of religious interest groups. In 1950, there were approximately sixteen major 
religious lobbies; in 1985, the number was eighty; in 1994, 120; and in 2012, there were 
more than 200 organizations engaged in religious lobbying. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, 
The Democratic Constitution 270 (2d ed. 2015). More generally, there has been a tremen-
dous upswing in the number of nonprofit organizations and, not surprisingly, there are sub-
stantially more interest groups likely to file amicus briefs. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John 
R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How 
Much? 52 J. Pol. 782, 783–84, 793 (1990) (noting characteristics of organizations that file 
amicus briefs); Registered 501(c)(3) Public Charities by IRS Ruling Date, Nat’l Ctr. for 
Charitable Statistics, http://nccsweb.urban.org/tablewiz/showreport.php (documenting ten-
fold growth of nonprofits from the 1950s (30,599) to the 2010s (326,101)). 6 See Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 Yale L.J. Online 89, 89 
(2009) [hereinafter Lazarus, Docket Capture], http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/84
1_89m7e6cx.pdf (“[T]he Court’s plenary docket is increasingly captured by an elite group of 
expert Supreme Court advocates, dominated by those in the private bar.”).  
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and they pair these groups with other Supreme Court specialists to im-
prove their chances with the Court.7 
The end result is orchestrated and intentional. Skilled advocates find 
the arguments that matter, the clients that matter, and the lawyers that 
matter—and then they match them up and package them for the Justices. 
A successful venture at the Supreme Court, in other words, requires a 
sophisticated “amicus strategy.”8 “We urged our friends to cover specif-
ic topics that added value to the merits,” Supreme Court specialist Kath-
leen Sullivan explained.9 “This is not a high-profit law practice . . . We 
really do think of it as a way of helping the court.”10 Sullivan and others 
have noticed that a calculated amicus plan like this has become “much 
more systematic.”11 And it works. 
Take, for example, King v. Burwell, 2015’s high-stakes decision 
about the Affordable Care Act.12 Breaking from tradition, the govern-
ment in that case used an outside member of the private Supreme Court 
Bar to recruit and coordinate amicus briefs in support of the its case.13 
These amicus efforts (which journalist Linda Greenhouse says “w[ere] 
no accident”) made a real difference;14 the Chief Justice cited two such 
 
7 For a fascinating account of the rise of the Supreme Court Bar, see Richard J. Lazarus, 
Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Trans-
forming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1525 (2008) [hereinafter Lazarus, Advocacy Matters] 
(describing the power and influence of members of the Supreme Court Bar, which includes 
“push[ing] hard for amici support”); Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, The 
Echo Chamber, Reuters (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/investigate
s/special-report/scotus/ [https://perma.cc/K57F-HMDK] (“They are the elite of the elite: Alt-
hough they account for far less than 1 percent of lawyers who filed appeals to the Supreme 
Court, these attorneys were involved in 43 percent of the cases the high [C]ourt chose to de-
cide from 2004 through 2012.”). For an earlier study of this phenomenon (including data 
contrasting amicus filings in cases handled by Supreme Court insiders and novices), see 
Kevin T. McGuire, The Supreme Court Bar: Legal Elites in the Washington Community 
121–26 (1993). 8 See Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind and Beyond Grutter, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. 889, 
895 (2004). 
9 Stephanie Francis Ward, Friends of the Court Are Friends of Mine, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 
2007, 8:10 PM) (quoting Kathleen Sullivan) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://ww
w.abajournal.com/magazine/article/friends_of_the_court_are_friends_of_mine [https://per
ma.cc/7PPM-5JZB]. 10 Id. (quoting Kathleen Sullivan) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Id.  12 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  13 See Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., The Roberts Court’s Reality Check, N.Y. Times (June 
25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/opinion/the-roberts-courts-reality-check.ht
ml. 14 Id. 
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briefs in his opinion, including one (filed on behalf of economists) on 
which he appears to have placed substantial reliance.15 
Examples like this abound. Many will recall the well-known amicus 
briefs for the military leaders and corporations filed in the 2003 affirma-
tive action case Grutter v. Bollinger.16 Justice O’Connor cited these 
briefs in her opinion for the Court, referenced them in her oral bench 
statement when the decision was announced, and mentioned one of them 
repeatedly in oral argument as the “Carter Phillips brief,” apparently re-
ferring to the lawyer who drafted it.17 Similarly and more recently, five 
Justices repeatedly asked the advocates in Hollingsworth v. Perry (one 
of the Court’s same-sex marriage cases) about standing arguments 
pressed by “the Dellinger brief”—referring to Walter Dellinger, another 
prominent Supreme Court expert.18 
But these briefs—seemingly influential on the Justices as far as we 
can tell—were not organically developed by concerned interest groups 
who saw the case as an opportunity to press their policy positions. They 
were instead the product of targeted recruitment and design by Supreme 
Court experts.19 Fingerprints of these experts can be seen on the amicus 
 
15 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486, 2493–94.  16 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The most-discussed brief was written by attorneys at Sidley Aus-
tin. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, 20 J.L. & Pol. 33, 33–34 (2004). For Carter Phillips’s accounting of the writing of the 
brief and why he thinks it was influential, see Carter G. Phillips, Was Affirmative Action 
Saved By Its Friends?, in A Year at the Supreme Court 113, 129 (Neal Devins & Davison M. 
Douglas eds., 2004). 17 Matthew M.C. Roberts, Oral Argument and Amicus Curiae 15 n.16 (2012); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 22, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“I’d like you to 
comment on Carter Phyllip’s [sic] brief. What is your view of the strength of that argu-
ment?”). Interestingly, Carter Phillips was not actually the author of the brief. The counsel of 
record was Virginia Seitz, Phillips’s law partner. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Re-
ceives Outpouring of Conflicting Views on Affirmative Action, Wash. Post (Oct. 7, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/supreme-court-receives-outpouring-
of-conflicting-views-on-affirmative-action/2012/10/07/d38c59c2-0f04-11e2-bb5e-492c0d
30bff6_story.html [https://perma.cc/8TS5-5GN3].  18 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(No. 12-144); Adam Liptak, Justices Say Time May Be Wrong for Gay Marriage Case, N.Y. 
Times (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-
marriage-case.html.  
19 See Denise O’Neil Green, Justice and Diversity: Michigan’s Response to Gratz, Grutter, 
and the Affirmative Action Debate, 39 Urb. Educ. 374, 386–88 (2004) (describing how 
Michigan enlisted the support of organizations as amici in Grutter); Madeleine Schachter, 
The Utility of Pro Bono Representation of U.S.-Based Amicus Curiae in Non-U.S. and Mul-
ti-National Courts as a Means of Advancing the Public Interest, 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 88, 
96–97 (2004) (noting that “Kathryn Kolbert coordinated the submission of amici briefs on 
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briefs cited by the Court in Riley v. California (the 2014 cell phone 
search case),20 a brief discussed in oral argument in Fisher v. University 
of Texas (the Court’s most recent affirmative action case),21 and a brief 
some say was responsible for the outcome in Hollingsworth (the above-
mentioned challenge to California’s ban on same-sex marriage).22  
Coordinated amicus briefs are not entirely new, but the forces that 
make them routine are new, and the cumulative effect of these forces—
what we call the “amicus machine”—is previously unrecognized. The 
amicus machine is our phrase to describe the origin of many amicus 
briefs today—a system where Supreme Court experts are responsible for 
recruiting amici and coordinating their messages to the Court. 
Several modern dynamics keep the machine running. First, as Profes-
sor Richard Lazarus has documented, the rise of the Supreme Court Bar 
over the last several decades has completely changed the nature of Su-
preme Court advocacy.23 Because these repeat players both solicit briefs 
from and write briefs for their cohorts, they enhance their reputations 
and increase the ranks of other lawyers who also perpetuate the amicus 
machine.24 
Moreover, the Court’s new hunger for information outside the record 
and the unprecedented rise in briefs conveying that information also fuel 
the amicus machine.25 It is an open secret inside the Beltway that as the 
sea of amici expands, a targeted amicus strategy becomes essential. So-
phisticated players know they need an “amicus wrangler” to ensure that 
their chosen expert voices (as opposed to the many competing ones) are 
 
behalf of the ACLU and the Planned Parenthood Federation in Webster v. Reprod. Health 
Servs.,” 492 U.S. 490 (1989)). 20 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486–87 (2014); Interview with Jeffrey L. Fisher, 
Professor and Co-Dir., Stanford Law Sch. Supreme Court Litig. Clinic, in Williamsburg, Va. 
(Sept. 25, 2015). 21 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
(No. 14-981).  
22 Interview with Walter Dellinger, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers, in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 
2015); see also Liptak, supra note 18 (noting that five Justices seemed persuaded by the 
kinds of standing arguments made in the Walter Dellinger brief).  23 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1488–92. 24 See infra Section II.B. 25 On the Justices’ increasing use of Internet searches to seek information not in the record, 
see Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1255, 
1260–62 (2012) [hereinafter Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding]. On the Jus-
tices’ increasing reliance on amicus filings to supplement the record with (sometimes incor-
rect) legislative facts, see Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 Va. L. 
Rev. 1757, 1761–64 (2014) [hereinafter Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts].  
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appropriately highlighted.26 Just as one might expect, and as one survey 
of Supreme Court law clerks reveals, the more amicus briefs that are 
filed on the merits, the greater the chance that the valuable ones will get 
lost in the shuffle.27 
Finally, the modern Supreme Court itself embraces the work of the 
amicus machine. The Justices seem to prefer a system dominated by Su-
preme Court specialists who can be counted on for excellent advocacy.28 
They look to these briefs both for legal theories and factual evidence, 
and they cite them at an increasingly high rate.29 The Justices also seem 
to prefer a system (fostered by these briefs) that facilitates the declara-
tion of broad legal rules rather than resolving narrow disputes.30 Su-
preme Court specialists are experts in identifying ways in which a case 
is a good or bad vehicle to establish broad legal principles and, as such, 
the amicus machine helps the Court identify which cases to hear and 
how to rule on those cases. 
The goals of this Article are twofold. One is to describe the current 
practice of amicus filings at the Supreme Court, explaining how it is that 
the Justices and members of the Supreme Court Bar both benefit from a 
system that incentivizes the filing of high-quality briefs by Supreme 
Court specialists. The other is to make the perhaps counterintuitive nor-
 
26 See Ward, supra note 9. For additional discussion, see Subsection II.A.2. 27 See Lynch, supra note 16, at 44–45. 28 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 3 (“In exclusive interviews, many of the justices 
acknowledge the growing specialization of the Supreme Court bar, and they largely welcome 
it.”). 29 Franze & Anderson, supra note 1 (noting that in 2014–15, the Justices cited amicus 
briefs in 55% of signed opinions, which is keeping with the overall increase in citations in 
the past five years). See also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 757 (“There is no question 
but that the total number of references to amici is substantial, and that the frequency of such 
references has been increasing over time.”). 30 Renowned Supreme Court advocate Carter Phillips explains: 
[A]s long as the Court properly views its role as announcing broad declarations of 
federal law that will significantly affect the litigating and programmatic interest of 
hundreds or thoughts of groups and millions of people, then it should solicit or at least 
be willing to entertain broader views than most single litigants can or are willing to 
provide. 
Philips, supra note 16, at 129. For recent studies suggesting that the Court increasingly sees 
its role as being law declarer and not dispute resolver, see Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Pra-
kash, Essay, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859, 863 (2013); Brianne J. Go-
rod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L.J. 1, 66 
(2011); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Mat-
ters, Essay, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 668–69 (2012). For further discussion, see infra Sec-
tion III.C.  
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mative claim that this amicus machine is actually beneficial. Several 
scholars and journalists, most famously Richard Lazarus and Joan 
Biskupic, have warned about the power of the Supreme Court Bar and 
the possibility of the Supreme Court’s docket being captured by a pro-
business club of elites.31 
While these worries are significant, we argue there are several over-
looked benefits to an amicus machine. Specifically, we note three: (1) 
the machine alters the role of the Solicitor General (“SG”), and disperses 
the advantage this office has long held to a broader group of people, thus 
increasing the number of individuals with credibility and reputation in-
terests at stake available to police unreliable claims made to the Court; 
(2) at the jurisdiction stage, the machine assists law clerks in finding 
cases that are worthy of the Court’s attention, an important signal in an 
era where circuit splits are less common and reasons for cert are more 
nuanced; and (3) it is an appropriate turn to reflect a larger change in the 
function of the Court, a Court less interested in resolving disputes and 
most interested in enunciating broad legal principles. Such a Court bene-
fits in hearing from Supreme Court specialists who understand the types 
of legal arguments and factual presentations that will be most useful to 
the Justices. 
To be sure, the amicus machine has downsides. It is clubby. It is elite. 
There is a risk that people who can afford the best advocates will get the 
ear of the Justices, and the democracy-enhancing ideal of the amicus 
will be lost. But, we argue, it is a mistake to focus only on the costs and 
to overlook the benefits. We push back on claims that the Supreme 
Court Bar is monolithically pro-business and that these lawyers effec-
tively dictate much of the Court’s docket. In an era of infinite infor-
mation and virtually limitless briefs, coordination efforts by Supreme 
Court experts are a controlling force on a potentially unruly system. At 
the end of the day, the amicus machine may be a virtue, and not a vice, 
of current Supreme Court practice. 
 
31 See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1531; Biskupic et al., supra note 7. Of 
course neither author makes the argument that the Supreme Court Bar is all bad. In fact, 
Lazarus specifically notes that “[a]s a general matter, the promotion of more effective advo-
cacy both before and within the Court should be considered a positive development.” Laza-
rus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1554. Biskupic likewise observes that the Justices 
“welcome” the growing specialization of the Supreme Court Bar. Biskupic et al., supra note 
7. See also infra Subsection II.B.3.  
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the traditional sto-
ry of Supreme Court amici: lobbying groups attempting to influence the 
policy that comes from Supreme Court decisions on the merits. Part II 
describes what we call “the amicus machine”: a more complicated story 
involving party coordination, a new emphasis on amicus briefs at the 
cert stage, and the multilayered incentives of those who file and receive 
amicus briefs. Part III then builds the normative argument in favor of the 
amicus machine, focusing on overlooked benefits of the current system. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL AMICUS STORY 
A. Evolution from Friend to Lobbyist 
Amicus briefs have ancient roots. Originating in Roman law and 
common in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an 
amicus curiae was an outsider to a dispute who a court would permit, 
and sometimes invite, to present “neutral, unbiased information.”32 The 
original amicus was a lawyer physically present in the courtroom who 
would assist the court with an “oral ‘shepardizing,’ the bringing up of 
cases not known to the judge.”33 
Shortly after crossing the Atlantic, however, the amicus curiae 
evolved, in the famed words of historian Samuel Krislov, “from friend-
ship to advocacy.”34 According to Krislov, the nature of the amicus 
changed in response to tough consequences and injustices that flowed 
from restrictions inherent in the adversarial process.35 These problems 
were exacerbated in America: “The assertion of judicial review and of 
the Court’s role as ‘umpire to the federal system’” meant that private 
disputes were used to shape the Constitution, leading the Supreme Court 
to “strictly scrutinize the right of parties to appear before federal courts 
as parties in interest.”36 
 
32 Roberts, supra note 17, at 7. See also Krislov, supra note 4, at 694 (providing compre-
hensive history of the amicus curiae).  33 Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First 
Amendment Litigation, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1605, 1607 (1999); see also Collins, supra 
note 2, at 38 (describing history of the amicus).  34 Krislov, supra note 4, at 694 (capitalization omitted). Indeed, at least one historian ar-
gues that there was never a time in America when the amicus did not play an advocacy role. 
Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and Their Friends, 1790-
1890, 20 Const. Comment. 111, 112–13 (2003).  
35 Krislov, supra note 4, at 696–97.  36 Id. at 697. 
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The name “amicus curiae” once described “an essentially professional 
relation to the Court,” where the amicus was the lawyer assisting the 
judge, not the client sponsoring the assistance.37 Through the end of the 
nineteenth century, American amici clung to this approach.38 Shortly af-
ter the turn of the twentieth century, however, this façade was aban-
doned and the amicus evolution from friend to advocate was almost 
complete.39 By the 1930s, it became common for the organizational 
sponsor to appear on the amicus brief.40 
Now everyone sees the amicus brief as the arm of an activist: “No 
longer a mere friend of the court, the amicus has become a lobbyist, an 
advocate, and, most recently, the vindicator of the politically power-
less.”41 Indeed, today organizations are established at least in part for the 
very purpose of filing amicus briefs; they do not seek to hide that they 
have a dog in the fight, calling themselves “litigating amic[i]” and 
“acknowledged adversaries.”42 
This amicus shift coincides with two other changes in American poli-
tics: the proliferation of interest groups to effectuate major social 
change,43 and the corresponding rise of the courts as engines of social 
reform.44 The end of the nineteenth century marked a departure from the 
personal politics of the handshake and the growth of the impersonal, or-
ganized, and systematic tools of interest group politics. 
According to many, the amicus flourished in this new environment.45 
The idea is that “[t]he emergence of the public law model and its matu-
ration over the latter half of the twentieth century created a ripe envi-
ronment for interested non-parties to weigh in on the development of 
 
37 Id. at 703. 38 Id.  39 Id. (describing how after the turn of the century the amicus was “no longer a neutral, 
amorphous embodiment of justice, but an active participant in an interest group struggle.”).  40 Id. 41 Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party 
Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 1243, 1245 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 42 Schachter, supra note 19, at 90–91 (alteration in original, emphasis and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
43 Krislov, supra note 4, at 704. 44 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1281, 1284, 1300–01 (1976) (discussing the rise of public law litigation and the ju-
diciary’s enlarged role in deciding social issues). 45 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 2, at 3; Lucius J. Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Sys-
temic View of the Judicial Function, 29 J. Pol. 41, 53, 60 (1967); Linda Sandstrom Simard, 
An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficien-
cy, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev. Litig. 669, 674 (2008).  
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policy through the courts; the amicus brief provided the tool to accom-
plish this goal.”46 
Many political scientists have explicitly made the analogy between 
amici curiae and interest-group lobbyists.47 “[W]hen law is perceived as 
a powerful instrument, individuals and groups within society will en-
deavor to seize or co-opt the law in every way possible.”48 Because ami-
ci engage in “partisan advocacy,” they “allow[] the Court to weigh ‘po-
litical’ information in a judicial way.”49 Amicus briefs, the story goes, 
are one mechanism—and a growing one—that motivated interest groups 
increasingly use to “further their economic, political, and social agen-
das.”50 
It stands to reason that amicus briefs would proliferate in conjunction 
with the explosion of interest groups and an ever-expanding judicial 
role. And amicus efforts have certainly intensified. Amicus briefs were 
filed in 96% of all Supreme Court cases in 2013–14, and in 98% of all 
cases decided in 2014–15 (meaning all but one case).51  
To put this in a historical perspective, “amici averaged roughly one 
brief per case in the 1950s and about five briefs per case in the 1990s.”52 
By contrast, the number of amicus briefs in the 2014-15 term’s same-sex 
marriage case reached 148 (a new record).53 The health care case two 
 
46 Simard, supra note 45, at 674; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 746 (attrib-
uting to Justice Scalia the suggestion that “amicus briefs reflect a form of interest group lob-
bying directed at the Court”).  47 Collins, supra note 2, at 1–2; Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic 
Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New 
Institutionalist Approaches 215, 215 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) 
(comparing the role of amici curiae for Justices to the role of lobbyists for legislators); 
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 783 (“Political scientists have long perceived an analogy 
between interest groups lobbying legislatures and interest groups seeking to influence judi-
cial decisions through the filing of amicus briefs.”). 
48 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 1 (2006).  49 Barker, supra note 45, at 53, 60. 50 Collins, supra note 2, at 3. 51 See Franze & Anderson, supra note 1; Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Justic-
es Are Paying More Attention to Amicus Briefs, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 8, 2014, at 11.  52 Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Amicus 
Curiae in the 2012-13 Term, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 18, 2013; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra 
note 2, at 765 n.71 (listing the average number of amicus briefs filed per case between 1986 
and 1995 as ranging from 3.3 to 5.46).  
53 Nina Totenberg, Record Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Same-Sex-Marriage Cases, 
Nat’l Pub. Radio (Apr. 28, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/0
4/28/402628280/record-number-of-amicus-briefs-filed-in-same-sex-marriage-cases.  
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years earlier, NFIB v. Sebelius, had 136 amicus briefs on the docket.54 
For the sake of comparison, consider that Roe v. Wade had “twenty-two 
or twenty-three” amicus briefs.55 In Brown v. Board of Education, there 
were only six.56 In Lochner v. New York, that number was zero.57 
The traditional tale connects the dramatic increase in the quantity of 
briefs to the rise of interest-group law reform efforts.58 The explosion of 
amici tracks the rise of interest-group politics generally.59 This story is 
well entrenched and familiar. As Paul Collins describes it, “interest 
group amicus participation at the Court is now the norm, not the excep-
tion.”60 This, he tells us, has “reached the status of conventional wis-
dom.”61 
B. “Friends of the Court” Not “Friends of the Party” 
One other aspect of the traditional amicus story merits a pause. Judge 
Richard Posner has explained that the proper role of an amicus is a 
“friend of the court,” not a “friend of the party.”62 Although acknowl-
edging “an adversary role of an amicus curiae has become accepted,” 
Judge Posner complains that these briefs should be reserved for situa-
tions when the adversary system fails to do its job—when party repre-
sentation is poor, when information is limited, or when voices of the 
 
54 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Franze & Anderson, supra note 1. 55 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Sarah Weddington, The Donahue Lecture Series: “Roe v. Wade: 
Past and Future” (Dec. 7, 1989), in 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 601, 605 (1990). 56 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 754 n.28; Mark V. Tushnet, 
The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925–1950 (1987) (discussing 
the litigation strategy laying the groundwork for Brown). 57 198 U.S. 45 (1905); 14 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Constitutional Law 653 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 58 See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, Frenemies of the Court: The Many Faces of Amicus Curi-
ae, 49 U. Rich. L. Rev. 361, 362 (2015) (“Amicus curiae participation has surged in recent 
years, primarily by interest and advocacy groups wishing to advance their law reform ef-
forts . . . .”); Simard, supra note 45, at 676–77. 
59 See Simard, supra note 45, at 6. 60 Collins, supra note 2, at 6. 61 Id. 62 Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997). As 
explained below, this reflects a larger belief about a separation between amicus and litigant. 
Of course, not everyone buys that tale. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 5, at 788 
(“[C]ontemporary amici are really friends of the parties, not necessarily friends of the Court, 
even though the original intent of amicus curiae briefs was, of course, to provide the Court 
with new information and to act in a neutral fashion.”).  
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population who will be affected by the legal rule in question are not be-
ing heard.63 
This intuition is widely shared. Two basic theories of amici utility run 
through the political science literature: (1) the affected groups theory; 
and (2) the information theory.64 Affected groups theory assumes the 
Justices “look to amicus briefs as a barometer of opinion on both sides 
of the issues.”65 Information theory suggests that amicus briefs are use-
ful “because they supplement the arguments of the parties by providing 
information not found in the parties’ briefs.”66 
What both of these theories share in common, however, is the as-
sumption reflected in the Posner quote: that an amicus brief is an entity 
that is separate from the parties.67 There is a common conception about 
amici curiae (perhaps folklore, perhaps not) that these briefs are democ-
racy enhancing because they operate outside of the adversary process.68 
Everyone is invited to the Supreme Court docket; the Justices want to 
hear all sides and opinions—not just the litigants’—before deciding a 
case.69  
Supreme Court rules reinforce this belief. Rule 37.1 states that an 
amicus brief “that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not 
 
63 Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063. For its part, the Supreme Court embraces this view when it ap-
points an amicus to advance arguments that neither party to a dispute is willing to advance. 
See Katherine Shaw, Essay, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus 
Invitations, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1533 (2016); Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme 
Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 Stan. 
L. Rev. 907, 909–10 (2011).  
64 Simard, supra note 45, at 681. 65 Id. 66 Id. at 682. 67 Id. at 680. 68 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 4, at 185 (“The modern process of amicus curiae partici-
pation is a form of political symbolism reflecting the Supreme Court’s irreconcilable role in 
American democracy as a quasi-representative policy-making institution.”). Indeed one 
scholar has even argued that amicus participation is protected by the First Amendment. Ru-
bin J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 319 
(2008). 
69 This view is also widely shared by members of the Supreme Court Bar. In interviews 
conducted for this paper, we asked leading Supreme Court advocates whether limits should 
be placed on the number of amicus briefs filed and whether lawyers for the parties should 
serve as gatekeepers to the filing of amicus briefs. Each and every lawyer we asked unequiv-
ocally rejected this suggestion precisely because of the democracy-enhancing characteristics 
of unrestricted amicus filings. See, e.g., Interviews with Lisa Blatt, Partner, Arnold & Porter, 
Paul Smith, Partner, Jenner & Block, and Charles Rothfeld, Special Counsel, Mayer Brown, 
in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 2015). 
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already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable 
help to the Court.”70 This rule, as Brianne Gorod has helpfully observed, 
is the Court’s way of explicitly encouraging arguments and claims out-
side what the adversary system can provide.71 
But the rules do even more to strengthen this separation. Rule 37.6 
requires disclosure if any lawyer for a party had a hand in funding or au-
thoring an amicus brief.72 Indeed, in the explanatory notes accompany-
ing this rule, the Clerk of the Supreme Court explained the disclosure 
was necessary “both in considering questions of recusal and in assessing 
the credibility to be attached to the views submitted by the amicus.”73 
This language suggests that an amicus brief is less credible when tainted 
by a party’s touch. 
According to the leading treatise on Supreme Court practice, the addi-
tion of this disclosure requirement in 2007 was prompted by “the 
Court’s perception that some parties to a case had silently been author-
ing or financing amicus curiae briefs in support of their positions.”74 
Although the rule was not meant “to discourage party counsel from so-
liciting supporting briefs from amici curiae,” it was “designed to dis-
courage party counsel from taking over the preparation and submission 
of supporting amici briefs.”75 
These rules underscore the separating line between Supreme Court 
amicus and Supreme Court litigant. It is a line, however, that was per-
haps always illusory and in any event is fading fast.76 
 
70 Sup. Ct. R. 37.1.  71 Gorod, supra note 30, at 36–37 (arguing that this rule encourages the Justices to abandon 
“the adversarial myth” and, particularly, to look outside the record for facts). 72 Sup. Ct. R. 37.6. This Rule was added in 1997 and amended in 2007. All amicus briefs 
have boilerplate language in the front of them to this effect:  
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party 
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this 
brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a mone-
tary contribution to its preparation or submission. 
Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice 518 n.174 (10th ed. 2013). The language 
came from an August 6, 2007 memorandum from the Clerk’s Office at the Supreme Court. 
See id.  
73 Id. at 518 (discussing Sup. Ct. R. 37.6).  74 Id. at 755. 75 Id.  76 As we demonstrate below, notwithstanding the Court’s 2007 rule change, the Justices 
themselves facilitate a system that rewards Supreme Court insiders who coordinate the filing 
of amicus briefs. See infra Subsections II.B.2–3.  
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II. THE AMICUS MACHINE 
The amicus folklore needs to be updated. To be sure, some amicus 
briefs are organically grown and the product of interest-group lobbying 
at the Court. But an increasing number are filed by—or at least recruited 
by—an elite few. Supreme Court practice in 2016 is very different from 
Supreme Court practice thirty years ago or even fifteen years ago. Sig-
nificant changes include the rise of an elite group of lawyers who handle 
the majority of business before the Court, the ease with which infor-
mation is submitted to the Court in a digital age, and an explosion of 
amicus briefs routinely filed at the Court.77 
Together these conditions have birthed what we call “the amicus ma-
chine”—a systematic, choreographed engine designed by people in the 
know to get the Justices the information they crave, packaged by law-
yers they trust. In researching this Article, and to understand the way the 
amicus process operates today, we interviewed twenty-six Supreme 
Court specialists from private firms, Supreme Court clinics, interest 
groups, state solicitor general offices, and the Federal Office of the So-
licitor General. These attorneys have collectively argued over 400 cases 
before the Court and have written or coordinated several thousand Su-
preme Court amicus briefs.78 
In this Section, we describe three facets of the machine: (1) party co-
ordination and control of amicus briefs by an elite group; (2) the compli-
cated incentives driving those that file these briefs and those that receive 
them; and (3) agenda setting for the Court by increased amicus briefs at 
the cert stage. 
A. Party Coordination & Control 
Over the past several decades, the art of practicing before the Su-
preme Court has transformed. Although there are technically over 
262,000 members of the Supreme Court Bar,79 the vast majority of cases 
 
77 Franze & Anderson, supra note 1; Franze & Anderson, Justices Are Paying More Atten-
tion to Amicus Briefs, supra note 51, at 11.  78 See infra Appendix (listing names and other information about the lawyers we inter-
viewed). In calculating oral argument totals, we looked to the attorney pages available on the 
Oyez website, https://www.oyez.org. In addition to advocates, we also spoke with three 
journalists who regularly cover the Court. Their names are also listed in the Appendix. 
79 See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1491 (noting 262,684 members as of 
2006). To become a member of the Supreme Court Bar, one only has to pass the minimal 
requirements of being admitted to practice law in any state for three years; earn sponsorship 
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now feature a select group of fewer than 100 lawyers who are repeat 
players at the Court.80 
1. The Players 
Richard Lazarus tells this story well.81 In 1985 the law firm of Sidley 
Austin hired Rex Lee, President Ronald Reagan’s first Solicitor Gen-
eral.82 Lee set out “to establish a highly visible Supreme Court and ap-
pellate practice that could provide to private sector clients the kind of 
outstanding expert advocacy that the Solicitor General’s Office had pro-
vided federal agencies.”83 In response to this hire, other private law 
firms followed suit—Mayer Brown hired deputy SGs Ken Geller and 
Andy Frey; Gibson Dunn hired former SG Ted Olson; Wilmer Cutler 
(now WilmerHale) hired former SG Seth Waxman; Hogan & Hartson 
(now Hogan Lovells) hired now-Chief Justice John Roberts fresh from 
his stint in the SG’s office, and so on.84 
Relatively quickly, a private Supreme Court Bar of elites began to de-
velop.85 And they now dominate. As documented in 2014 by Joan 
Biskupic and her colleagues at Reuters, from “the pool of approximately 
17,000 lawyers and 8,000 law firms doing business at the Court over the 
last decade, 66 lawyers and 31 firms stood out” as writing the most peti-
tions, briefs, and earning oral argument most frequently.86 As a group, 
this “elite cadre of lawyers” was “involved in 43 percent of cases the 
high [C]ourt agreed to hear.”87 Indeed, eight lawyers now account for 
 
by two current members; submit a $200 check payable to the Court; and have a certificate of 
good standing from your bar. Id.  
80 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1; Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 
1492–93 & n.28. For other accounts corroborating Biskupic and Lazarus’s accounts of the 
rise of the Supreme Court Bar, see, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme 
Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. Pol. 187, 187–88 
(1995) [hereinafter McGuire, Repeat Players]; John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the 
Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 68, 75–76 (2005); Joseph W. 
Swanson, Experience Matters: The Rise of a Supreme Court Bar and Its Effect on Certiorari, 
9 J. App. Prac. & Process 175, 176–77 (2007).  
81 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1492. 82 Id. at 1498. 83 Id. 84 Id. at 1499–1500; see Kenneth S. Geller, Mayer Brown, https://www.mayerbrown.co
m/en-US/people/Kenneth-S-Geller/; Andrew L. Frey, Mayer Brown, https://www.mayerbro
wn.com/people/andrew-l-frey/. 85 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1497, 1501. 86 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 3.  87 Id. pts. 1, 3. 
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20% of oral arguments made by private attorneys, and the vast majority 
of lawyers appearing before the Court have made more than one argu-
ment (as compared to 1980, when roughly 80% of advocates were argu-
ing for their first time).88 
Although leading the pack, the big firms were not the only ones to 
develop lawyers who specialize in practicing before the Court. Many 
states (currently the number has reached thirty-eight) have built state so-
licitor general offices, modeled after the U.S. Solicitor General and typi-
cally staffed by former Supreme Court law clerks.89 Additionally, a few 
nonprofit organizations—although certainly not the majority—have be-
gun building their own “in-house” Supreme Court litigators. The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) for example, employs lawyers with 
significant Supreme Court expertise.90 And the Chamber of Com-
merce—representing business interests—has been on a hiring spree of 
Supreme Court law clerks recently and has “created the equivalent of a 
boutique law firm at its headquarters.”91 
A perhaps surprising addition to this club comes from the country’s 
youngest lawyers: Supreme Court clinics at the nation’s leading law 
schools. Stanford’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, led by giants of the 
Supreme Court Bar Jeffrey Fisher and Pamela Karlan, was the first of 
this sort of innovative organization.92 Similar clinics now exist all across 
 
88 Id. pt. 3 (listing the 2014 statistics); Roberts, supra note 80, at 75 (providing the 1980 
figure). 
89 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1501; Telephone Interview with Dan 
Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel, Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. (Feb. 29, 2016) (stating 
that today there are thirty-eight states with solicitor general offices). See generally Symposi-
um Transcript, The Rise of Appellate Litigators and State Solicitors General, 29 Rev. Litig. 
545, 637–42 (2010) (charting growth of state solicitor general offices since 2000). The Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) has pushed for the creation of these of-
fices and taken other steps to facilitate coordinated Supreme Court filings by the states. Tel-
ephone Interview with Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel, NAAG (Oct. 28, 2015). 
For example, NAAG circulates draft briefs to Attorneys General, organizes moot courts, and 
takes other steps to improve the quality of state representation and influence before the Su-
preme Court. See id. 
90 Telephone Interview with Steven R. Shapiro, Legal Dir., ACLU (Nov. 18, 2015). 91 John Shiffman, Chamber of Commerce Forms Its Own Elite Law Team, Reuters (Dec. 
8, 2014, 6:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-firms-chamber-idUSKBN0JM1
0Q20141208 [https://perma.cc/GTD4-D4YS].  92 The Stanford clinic was founded by Professor Karlan and Tom Goldstein, now of Gold-
stein & Russell, a law firm that specializes in Supreme Court practice. Michael Falcone, 
Stanford Law Students Get Early Supreme Court Duty, N.Y. Times (Mar. 15, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/education/stanford-law-students-get-early-supreme-
court-duty.html.  
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the country—at law schools at Yale, Harvard, Penn, Chicago, Texas, 
Northwestern, UCLA, and Virginia, to name a few. First created in 
2004, clinics of this sort pair eager, hard-working students with experi-
enced Supreme Court litigators to offer pro bono services that rival an 
elite firm’s Supreme Court practice but in the context of an academic in-
stitution.93 
The idea for these clinics is based on a belief that also fuels the exist-
ence of the Supreme Court Bar generally: Supreme Court practice is dif-
ferent in kind than other litigation and requires highly specialized skills. 
As Pam Karlan explains, “there is real lawyering, and not merely doctri-
nal analysis, behind the Supreme Court’s decisions.”94 Examples of 
these special skills range “[f]rom identifying cert-worthy cases to filing 
petitions for cert to writing merits briefs to dealing with amici and some-
times the government,” she says.95 
The goal of the clinics is to teach these skills to emerging young stars 
of the legal profession while simultaneously making a mark on the Su-
preme Court’s docket and decisions.96 And their footprint is wide. Over 
the past five Supreme Court terms, Supreme Court clinics have repre-
sented either petitioners or respondents in fifty-four cases before the 
Court. Clinics now represent a party in more than 10% of the Court’s 
plenary docket.97 In 2015 alone, these clinics represented ten parties be-
fore the Court and six other groups as amici. The clinics at Yale, Penn, 
Virginia, and Stanford, among others, can all boast recent victories at the 
Court in several high-profile cases.98 And the Stanford Law Clinic, by 
 
93 Id. 94 Pamela S. Karlan et al., Go East, Young Lawyers: The Stanford Law School Supreme 
Court Litigation Clinic, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 207, 210 (2005). 95 Id. 96 Id. at 226 (“[W]e hope that the Clinic is well on the way to developing what the Court 
once called ‘a corporate reputation for expertness in presenting and arguing the difficult 
questions of law that frequently arise’ in cases before it.” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 422 (1963))). 97 Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 143 
(2013). In the October 2015 Supreme Court term, the UCLA clinic had four cases before the 
Court, and the Yale clinic marked ten consecutive years of having at least one case before 
the Court. The fifty-four cases were collected by examining the briefs filed in all cases be-
fore the Supreme Court during the 2014–15 term and noting the cases in which an appellate 
or Supreme Court clinic filed a party or amicus brief. 98 See, e.g., Penn Law Supreme Court Clinic Wins Important Constitutional Case, U. Pa. 
L. Sch. (June 10, 2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/2667-penn-law-supreme-
court-clinic-wins-important#.VqKGZsdhPlI [https://perma.cc/423X-CDQY]; Supreme Court 
Clinic Successful in Recently Decided Cases, Yale L. Sch. (June 22, 2010), https://www.la
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one count, actually has a higher rate of cert grants than any other practic-
ing lawyer before the Court (with a cert grant rate of 29%).99  
Cumulatively, the dramatic rise of private firms with Supreme Court 
practices, state SG offices, in-house Supreme Court specialists at non-
profits, and law school Supreme Court clinics has led to a set of repeat 
players on the steps of the Court. This change is quite visible. As Chief 
Justice Roberts explains in his history on the subject, “[i]n 1980, the 
odds that the advocate making his way to the lectern for an oral argu-
ment before the Supreme Court had ever been there before were about 
one in three.”100 By 2002, “those odds were over 50 percent.”101 More 
and more, the Chief Justice tells us, “there are familiar faces appearing 
at the lectern.”102 
2. The “Amicus Wrangler” 
These familiar faces are doing more than just appearing before the 
Court at oral argument. Behind the scenes, their handiwork can be felt 
even more keenly—and particularly so in their role as “friends of the 
Court.” To borrow Kathleen Sullivan’s terrific phrase, every Supreme 
Court team needs an “amicus wrangler”—someone who has the job of 
recruiting the “right” amici.103 
Paul Smith, a leading Supreme Court advocate who has argued nearly 
twenty cases before the Court, including Lawrence v. Texas,104 explains 
the process this way: 
 
w.yale.edu/yls-today/news/supreme-court-clinic-successful-recently-decided-cases [https://p
erma.cc/5RDL-A78X]; UVA Law Supreme Court Litigation Clinic Wins Facebook Threat 
Case, U. Va. L. Sch. (June 1, 2015), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2015_sum/eloni
s-update.htm?v=fLEDXl-jcak [https://perma.cc/GDR9-YFS5]; Jeffrey L. Fisher & Sharan 
Driscoll, Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic Wins Landmark Fourth 
Amendment Case on Cellphone Searches, Stan. L. Sch. (June 25, 2014), https://law.stanfor
d.edu/2014/06/25/stanford-law-schools-supreme-court-litigation-clinic-wins-landmark-
fourth-amendment-case-on-cellphone-searches/. 99 Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding Certainty in Cert: An Empirical Analy-
sis of the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari Decisions from 2001–2015, at 26 (S. 
Cal. Law Sch. Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-5, 2016) http://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715631 [https://perma.cc/5PP7-WZE3]. 
100 Roberts, supra note 80, at 78. 101 Id. 102 Id. at 79. 103 Ward, supra note 9. 104 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see Our People: Paul M. Smith, Jenner & Block, https://jenne
r.com/people/PaulSmith [https://perma.cc/S9JC-YWRB] 
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At the Supreme Court level, sophisticated parties and counsel often 
convene meetings of potential amici in an  attempt to form coalitions 
and to influence the nature of the  presentations that will be made. Po-
tential amici, in turn, often contact counsel for the party they support, 
recognizing that such party coordination can be beneficial.105  
Each sophisticated Supreme Court team thus has an amicus mastermind, 
or as one commentator calls it an “Amicus Queen.”106 
This role is not entirely new. There is evidence amicus briefs were 
coordinated in Roe v. Wade, for example.107 And indeed Justice Gins-
burg was known for her skill at coordinating amici when she was litigat-
ing before the Court in the 1970s and 1980s.108 
But while coordinating briefs may have been a smart move in 1973, it 
is an absolutely essential move now. Carter Phillips, who has argued 
more cases before the Court than any other private advocate currently 
practicing,109 explains the changes he has seen in the amicus practice: 
“It’s been interesting to watch the changes over the years,” says Phillips. 
“The situation now is there is virtually no case that doesn’t have amicus 
briefs, and sometimes the number of briefs is breathtaking.”110 With so 
many briefs out there demanding the Court’s attention, it is necessary to 
dedicate firm resources to “herd the cats.”111 
Apart from the expansion of the Court’s available “friends,” there is 
another change motivating the “amicus wrangler” these days. The Su-
preme Court has embarked on “a widespread empirical turn,”112 and its 
 
105 Paul M. Smith, The Sometimes Troubled Relationship Between Courts and Their 
“Friends”, No. 4 Litig., Summer 1998, 24, 25. 
106 Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas: How a Bedroom 
Arrest Decriminalized Gay Americans 198 (2012) (referring to Lawrence litigator Susan 
Sommer). 107 410 U.S. 113 (1973); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and 
the Making of Roe v. Wade 491–95 (1994); Weddington, supra note 55, at 605. 108 See Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project, 11 Tex. J. Women & L. 157, 224–25 (2002) (“A critical compo-
nent of Ginsburg’s litigation strategy was the coordination of amicus briefs for the cases on 
which she was the primary attorney.”).  
109 Carter Phillips, Sidley Austin, http://www.sidley.com/people/carter-phillips [https://pe
rma.cc/NJ2K-SCEM] 110 See Ward, supra note 9; Interview with Carter Phillips, Partner, Sidley Austin, in Wil-
liamsburg, Va. (Feb. 28, 2012).  111 Interview with Carter Phillips, Partner, Sidley Austin, in Williamsburg, Va. (Feb. 28, 
2012). 
112 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-neutral Principles and Constitutional 
Truths, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 118 (2003). 
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decisions are full of factual claims about the way the world works, so-
called “legislative facts.”113 Several of the advocates we spoke to were 
of the belief that one could not win a Supreme Court case without as-
sembling a portfolio of “Brandeis briefs” from historians, social scien-
tists, physicians, and other individuals who could impart their expertise 
to the Court as amici.114 Competing expert briefs are mainstream now, 
and conventional wisdom is that you cannot win a big case without 
them.115 In fact, Professor A.E. Dick Howard calls the modern collection 
of expert amici an “arms race” between Supreme Court parties.116 
In the new world of amicus domination and factual free-for-all, re-
cruitment and message coordination become imperative. And that is ex-
actly what these sophisticated actors are doing. Newspaper accounts 
have documented coordinated amicus strategies employed in the recent 
federal same-sex marriage case,117 the D.C. Second Amendment case,118 
the case about health care subsidies in the Affordable Care Act,119 and 
 
113 One of us has previously written about this change in the Court’s emphasis on facts. 
See Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 25, at 1256. 
114 The Brandeis brief is a colloquial term for a brief to the Court that focuses only on 
submitting factual information. Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, supra note 25, at 
1770.  115 See Interviews with Lisa Blatt, Partner, Arnold & Porter, in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 
2015); Walter Dellinger, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers, in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 2015); Jef-
frey L. Fisher, Professor and Co-Dir., Stanford Law Sch. Supreme Court Litig. Clinic, in 
Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 25, 2015). 116 A.E. Dick Howard, The Changing Face of the Supreme Court, 101 Va. L. Rev. 231, 
274–75 (2015).  
117 Oralandar Brand-Williams, Same-Sex Marriage Case in Court: Attorney Mary Bonau-
to, Detroit News (Apr. 24, 2015, 6:38 PM), http:// www.detroitnews.com/story/news/poli
tics/michigan/2015/04/23/sex-marriage-case-court-attorney-mary-bonauto/26277549/ 
[https://perma.cc/CG8A-6NBL] (highlighting the role of Mary Bonauto, the legal director of 
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, stating, “Bonauto also led GLAD’s federal court 
challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act, which led to the first district and appellate court 
victories against DOMA. She also coordinated amicus briefs for the Windsor case at the Su-
preme Court.”). 
118 Robert Barnes, D.C. Gun Case Draws Crowd of High Court ‘Friends’, Wash. Post 
(Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/08/A
R2008030802243.html [https://perma.cc/DVP7-7BPD] (“Alan Gura, who will represent Dis-
trict resident Dick Anthony Heller in arguing the challenge to D.C.’s law on March 18, coor-
dinated the 47 amici who have filed on his client’s behalf since the court took the case.”). 119 Robert Pear, Flood of Briefs on the Health Care Law’s Subsidies Hits the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/us/flood-of-briefs-
on-the-health-care-laws-subsidies-hits-the-supreme-court.html (“Critics of the law coordi-
nated their briefs, as did supporters of the Obama administration, to a lesser degree.”). 
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the case about religious exemptions from the Affordable Care Act for 
Hobby Lobby,120 to name a few. 
It is not just the flashiest cases that require an “amicus wrangler,” 
however. Kathleen Sullivan explains that amicus coordination has par-
ticularly increased in business-related cases.121 In an interview with the 
ABA Journal, Sullivan discussed a 2005 case that challenged bans of di-
rect wine shipment to out-of-state consumers.122 Sullivan was counsel of 
record for the challengers in that case, along with Kenneth W. Starr, 
then-Dean of Pepperdine Law School and of counsel at Kirkland & Ellis 
in Los Angeles. Sullivan and Starr recruited lawyers to file amicus briefs 
for the appeal: “[o]ne laid out the history, and another laid out alterna-
tive regulations for wine shipment, showing how to protect minors and 
collect taxes.”123 
One job of the “amicus wrangler,” therefore, is to function much like 
a trial lawyer by selecting a roster of expert witnesses for trial. This is no 
small task. Indeed, as demonstrated in a recent fight over attorneys’ fees 
in a Supreme Court case, the cost of “soliciting and coordinating amici 
support” was billed at over $531,000.124 Of course supporting amici are 
optional, but a careful attorney dare not forego building his “team” of 
specialists. Although perhaps an extreme example, on at least one occa-
sion Justice Alito faulted a respondent for not disputing the factual 
claims from experts in amicus briefs filed to support the other side.125 
In addition to assembling experts, Supreme Court specialists also 
know that sometimes the names of those filing the briefs matter to the 
Justices (and their law clerks) just as much as the names of the organiza-
tions (or experts) sponsoring them.126 Thus one way to highlight the 
 
120 Brigitte Amiri, Senior Staff Att’y, ACLU Representative Freedom Project, Remarks at 
the Center for Gender & Sexuality Law’s Symposium on Marriage Equality and Reproduc-
tive Rights (Feb. 28, 2014), in The Hobby Lobby Amicus Effort, 29 Colum. J. Gender & L. 
104, 107–08 (2015) (“[W]e convened a call and we tried to decide what messages, what 
points we wanted the Court to hear, and which messengers should make those points. . . . We 
ended up with twenty-three amicus briefs, most of which, the coordinators knew about.”). 
121 Ward, supra note 9. 122 Id.; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465 (2005).  123 Ward, supra note 9. 124 See Brief of Respondent at 10, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 890 
(2016) (No. 15-375), 2016 WL 1165966, at *10. 125 See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015) (“Clark does not dispute those find-
ings.”). 
126 See Lynch, supra note 16, at 44 (“During their terms, clerks developed expectations of 
quality from certain repeat, regular Supreme Court advocates. One clerk explained that look-
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most important briefs for the Justices is to recruit the most important 
people to author them. 
Indeed, this does not necessarily happen in the order one might sup-
pose. Jeff Fisher, Supreme Court specialist and Stanford Law professor, 
explains that it is easier to convince an interest group to file an amicus 
brief if one comes to that conversation with a willing author ready.127 
Take for example the amicus brief filed on behalf of the Seattle Float-
ing Homes Association and the Floating Homes Association of Sausalito 
in the recent statutory interpretation case about whether floating homes 
count as “vessels” in admiralty law.128 Fane Lozman, petitioner in the 
Supreme Court case, owned a floating home in Florida and was chal-
lenging the designation of his home as a “vessel,” which would subject 
him to various rules coming from admiralty law.129 
Jeff Fisher represented Lozman as petitioner, and he knew he would 
need to convince the Court that floating homes were generally more like 
homes than like boats—a fact not easily demonstrated on the facts of 
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,130 but was easier to establish in com-
munities like Seattle and Sausalito. Fisher first reached out to floating 
home associations in both communities; they were potentially interested 
but did not have the resources to get involved. He then reached out to a 
friend at the law firm of Munger, Tolles & Olson who found an associ-
ate (and former Supreme Court clerk) interested and eager to volunteer 
because he happened to be from Sausalito. After securing an author for 
the brief, Fisher went back and again pitched the idea to the community 
groups in Seattle and Sausalito. It was a much easier pitch to those or-
ganizations, Fisher explains, with a Supreme Court specialist already on 
board.131 
 
ing at the attorney and law firm names on an amicus brief ‘decreased the informational cost 
of determining what would help.’”). 127 Interview with Jeffrey L. Fisher, Professor and Co-Dir., Stanford Law Sch. Supreme 
Court Litig. Clinic, in Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 25, 2015). 128 Brief for the Seattle Floating Homes Ass’n and the Floating Homes Ass’n of Sausalito 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 
735 (2013) (No. 11-626), 2012 WL 1773029, at *1. 129 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739–40.  130 Id. at 735. 131  Interview with Jeffrey L. Fisher, Professor and Co-Dir., Stanford Law Sch. Supreme 
Court Litig. Clinic, in Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 25, 2015). 
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And Fisher’s wrangling efforts paid off. This amicus brief was dis-
cussed at oral argument,132 addressed by the respondent in its brief,133 
and even cited in Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for the point that 
many states treat floating homes like ordinary land-based homes rather 
than like vessels.134 
3. The “Amicus Whisperer”135 
The coordination of amici does not stop with recruitment, however. If 
the “amicus wrangler” finds willing amici, it is the job of the “amicus 
whisperer” to keep those amici in line. Mindful of the important strate-
gic benefits amici can provide and fearful of duplicating efforts, or—
worse—missing a chance to make a valuable point to the Justices, many 
Supreme Court advocates do not just recruit amici participation, but ef-
fectively handle the ones that they’ve got. 
In the past, when a case like Brown v. Board would attract only six 
amicus briefs, there was little need for an “amicus whisperer.”136 Now, 
by contrast, without such effort there is a good chance the briefs the par-
ties deem most valuable will get lost in a sea of green (the color of brief 
cover for amici). As one advocate candidly described the plan, “We 
were trying to narrow the number of amicus briefs and trying to encour-
age people to work together to file a single brief rather than having mul-
tiple briefs because frankly, the Court’s just not going to read a ton of 
briefs.”137 
A well-documented example of using an “amicus whisperer” (and a 
wrangler to boot) is Neal Katyal in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case from 
2006 about the propriety of using military tribunals to try enemy com-
 
132 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735 (No. 11-626), 2012 WL 
4486096, at *16. 133 Brief for Respondent at 54–55, Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735 (No. 11-626), 2012 WL 
2883262, at *54. 134 Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 744.  135 Pam Karlan coined this phrase in connection with Mary Bonauto’s coordination of 
amicus filings in the DOMA case, United States v Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). E-mail 
correspondence with Pamela S. Karlan, Professor, Stanford Law Sch. (Feb. 9, 2016); see al-
so Justin Peters, Mary Bonauto, Gay Marriage Hero, Slate (June 26, 2013), http://www.slat
e.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/06/mary_bonauto_doma_repeal_wh
y_every_gay_marriage_supporter_should_be_thanking.html [https://perma.cc/VRW7-75KJ] 
(describing Mary Bonauto as the “mastermind behind the legal strategy” in Windsor). 
136 Supra note 56 and accompanying text. 137 Amiri, supra note 120, at 108. 
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batants held in Guantanamo Bay.138 Perhaps unlike the houseboat case 
discussed above, the Hamdan case was extremely high profile and gen-
erated a lot of interest in groups wanting to file amicus briefs. 
According to Katyal, managing these amici took a lot of work.139 The 
goal, he says, was “to ensure that the Court was hearing only from a far-
flung and diverse set of amici, represented by the best advocates, with 
the most affected clients, with the most expertise on the issues, and with 
no repetition.”140 
This means, first, that Katyal turned down several groups who wanted 
to file amicus briefs. It is the widespread custom for parties at the Su-
preme Court to file blanket consent to amicus briefs. Katyal chose not to 
do that in this litigation—in part because “[t]here were over 150 pro-
posed briefs, and [Katyal] spent hundreds of hours convincing groups 
not to submit them.”141 He ultimately settled on a cast of just thirty-
seven amicus briefs.142 His reasons were straightforward: He “didn’t 
want to overwhelm the justices with amicus briefs and, in so doing, 
blunt the impact of the strongest ones.”143 
Second, Katyal took one additional step at orchestrating the amici. 
“[W]ith the permission of the Clerk of the Court,” he pioneered “the use 
of a short label on the cover of each amicus brief that announced the 
unique substantive issue it addressed.”144 This not only organized the 
amicus effort, but also subtly signaled to the Justices which briefs were 
particularly important to him. 
Finally, Katyal was very involved with the substance of the amicus 
briefs; he “insisted on micromanaging the process” and “control[ling] 
the message.”145 For this he arranged an outside manager—or “whisper-
er” if you will,—to oversee the entire amicus process: David Remes of 
 
138 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). 139 Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to 
Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 118 (2006) (“The Hamdan case required intense coordination 
and management of team members (both students and lawyers), along with affected nongov-
ernmental organizations, executive branch officials, members of Congress and their staffs, 
diplomats and foreign leaders, retired generals and admirals, and other lawyers scattered 
across the globe.”). 140 Id.  141 Id.; see also Jonathan Mahler, The Challenge: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Fight over 
Presidential Power 231–32 (2008) (recounting the litigation strategy of Hamdan).  142 Mahler, supra note 141, at 231. 143 Id. at 231–32. 144 Katyal, supra note 139, at 118. 145 Mahler, supra note 142, at 231. 
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Covington and Burling, whom Katyal describes as “a trusted legal con-
fidant.”146 
Anointing an outside “amicus whisperer” is a growing trend because 
it offers several advantages. Most obviously, keeping track of all amici, 
particularly in a marquee case, can take a lot of time and an extra hand 
or two is often essential. But outsourcing the “amicus whisperer” has 
other benefits as well. Recall that Supreme Court Rule 37.6 requires par-
ties to disclose when they have funded or authored any amicus brief.147 
Supreme Court advocates hold different views about when heavy editing 
of amicus briefs crosses the line and becomes authoring (one person told 
us he is okay with comment bubbles but not redlining sentences). When 
the person coordinating the amici message is not a lawyer for a party, 
however, he or she has a lot more editing leeway without running afoul 
of the rules. 
B. The Incentives: A Political Economy of the Amicus Process 
The perpetuation of the amicus machine is quite mysterious if money 
is the principal motivator; amicus briefs are certainly not big money 
makers for those who file them.148 Why, then, have these briefs become 
such a staple in a Supreme Court practice? Why do high-demand litiga-
tors spend time wrangling and whispering to amici? And what makes the 
Justices seem to prefer amicus briefs authored and recruited by members 
of the machine? 
In this Section, we will explain the various incentives that propel the 
amicus machine—the interests driving the law firms and Supreme Court 
specialists who head these appellate groups, what the Office of the So-
licitor General has at stake, and finally, the interests motivating the Jus-
tices and the law clerks who receive these briefs. 
1. The Private Bar 
The principal drive of the amicus machine comes from the lawyers 
who practice before the Court, chiefly the private sector Supreme Court 
 
146 Id. at 200. 147 Sup. Ct. R. 37.6. 148 See Ward, supra note 9 (quoting Thomas Goldstein, who heads the Supreme Court 
practice at Akin Gump in Washington, D.C., as saying, “It’s more about having the practice 
than the revenue the practice generates. . . . It shows the firm’s ability to operate at a very 
high level”); id. (quoting Kathleen Sullivan, who observed that Supreme Court practice is 
“not a high-profit[s]” business (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Bar. To start, as Kathleen Sullivan observed: “With the shrinking dock-
et, there are too many [private sector] Supreme Court lawyers chasing 
too few cases on the merits. . . . So, many of us who have strong inter-
ests in the cases find ways to contribute by filing amicus briefs.”149 
Indeed, as Table 1 reveals, a survey of merits and amicus filings by 
thirty-one leading law firms reveals that amicus briefs filed between July 
1, 2013 and October 1, 2015 (304 total) substantially outnumbered mer-
its briefs (113 counsel of record). Indeed, while several firms had no 
cases before the Court as counsel of record, all firms filed amicus briefs. 
Correspondingly, twenty-eight of the thirty-one firms filed more amicus 
briefs than counsel of record briefs. 
Why chase these briefs at all? Amicus writers typically receive little 
or no compensation150 and, with the Supreme Court hearing just seventy 
to eighty cases a year,151 there is little monetary incentive for law firms 
to establish practice groups filled with high-priced lawyers whose claim 
to fame is often that they clerked on the Supreme Court and/or argued 
cases before the Supreme Court while working at the Office of Solicitor 
General.152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 Id. 150 Ward, supra note 9; Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 2; Interviews with Lisa Blatt, Part-
ner, Arnold & Porter, in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 2015); Paul Smith, Partner, Jenner & Block, 
in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 2015). 151 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1557.  152 See infra Section I.B. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Merits and Amicus Filings153  
 
Firm Counsel of 
Record Briefs 
Other Party 
Briefs 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Akin Gump 0 0 8 
Baker & McKenzie 0 0 3 
Baker Botts 3 2 5 
Bancroft 6 4 9 
Davis Wright 1 0 9 
Dechert 0 3 13 
Donahue & Goldberg 3 2 4 
Gibson Dunn 11 1 24 
Goldstein & Russell 9 7 7 
Greenberg Traurig 2 2 4 
Hunton & Williams 4 2 3 
Jones Day 8 3 17 
Kellogg Huber 4 4 11 
King & Spalding 1 1 7 
Kirkland & Ellis 4 3 8 
Latham & Watkins 2 1 8 
Mayer Brown 6 2 22 
Morgan Lewis 2 1 4 
Morrison & Foerster 1 0 9 
O’Melveny & Myers 3 0 10 
Orrick Herrington 1 1 13 
Paul Hastings 0 1 3 
Robbins Russell 1 0 6 
Ropes & Gray 4 0 8 
Sidley Austin 12 12 23 
Skadden 0 0 11 
 
153 Joan Biskupic and her colleagues at Reuters identified these thirty-one law firms as 
those which filed at least eighteen petitions and had at least ten percent granted between 
2004 and 2012. See Biskupic et al., supra note 7 (“The 31 top firms met Reuters’ criteria of 
filing at least 18 petitions – an average of two a year – in the period, making them extreme 
outliers among the 8,000 firms that filed appeals. At least 10 percent of their petitions – and 
no fewer than three – were granted certiorari, a success rate that is double the overall aver-
age.”). In preparing this table, we conducted searches in the Westlaw Supreme Court Briefs 
database for each of the thirty-one firms. On some briefs, there is more than one firm of rec-
ord because of multiple parties on the same brief. 
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Vinson & Elkins 4 2 6 
Weil 1 0 4 
Wiley Rein 1 1 11 
Williams & Connolly 4 1 2 
WilmerHale 15 6 32 
 
One explanation is that Supreme Court lawyers and the law firms that 
employ them see the Supreme Court practice as a bit of a “loss lead-
er,”154 a practice that sustains itself largely for nonmonetary reasons, and 
the “amicus machine” fits well with this business model. Former Solici-
tors General Seth Waxman, Ken Starr, Ted Olson, and Paul Clement, for 
example, have all taken on high-visibility cases either pro bono or at a 
deeply discounted fee.155 Likewise, top Supreme Court law firms rou-
tinely sign onto pro bono amicus campaigns. For example, in a March 
2016 cert petition involving birthright citizenship in U.S. territories, 
Gibson Dunn, WilmerHale, Bancroft, Mayer Brown, King & Spalding, 
Jenner & Block, Simpson Thacher, and Boies, Schiller & Flexner part-
nered on a coordinated amicus campaign.156 
Putting the money aside, law firms gain in important ways through 
the hiring of Supreme Court specialists and the filing of amicus briefs. 
These specialists are obviously exceptional lawyers who practice in oth-
er areas—appearing before federal and state appeals courts and even ar-
guing dispositive lower court motions.157 The principal monetary drive 
of these practices is tied to their appellate work outside of the Supreme 
 
154 Greg Garre, Chairman, Supreme Court and Appellate Practice, Latham & Watkins, 
Address at William & Mary Law School: Supreme Court Preview 2015–16, Supreme Court 
Bar (Sept. 26, 2015); Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1557–58. 155 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (death penalty, Waxman); Morse v. Fred-
erick, 551 U.S. 393, 395 (2007) (public school student speech, Starr); Hollingsworth v. Per-
ry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2013) (same-sex marriage, Olson); Bond v. United States, 564 
U.S. 211, 213 (2011) (treaty obligations, Clement); see also Biskupic et al., supra note 7; 
Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1518; Telephone Interview with Paul Clement, 
Partner, Bancroft (Feb. 15, 2016). 156 See Supreme Court Petition Receives Boost from Seven Amicus Briefs, We the People 
Project (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.equalrightsnow.org/supreme_court_petition_receives_b
oost_from_seven_amicus_briefs. [https://perma.cc/5D2D-EF9J] Thanks to Adam Liptak for 
telling us about this coordinated amicus effort. 
157 Interview with Kannon Shanmugam, Partner, Williams & Connolly, in Williamsburg, 
Va. (Sept. 26, 2015); Telephone Interview with Anthony Franze, Counsel, Arnold & Porter 
(Nov. 2, 2015).  
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Court,158 and only one law firm (Goldstein & Russell) dedicates itself 
solely to Supreme Court practice.159 In other words, glittering Supreme 
Court practitioners bring in other kinds of appellate business, and it is 
that business that sustains the Supreme Court Bar. 
Supreme Court practices help law firms in other ways as well. The 
briefs they file before the Supreme Court are prominently displayed on 
their law firm websites160 and, more generally, law firms publicize the 
hiring of these lawyers,161 their public appearances,162 their interviews 
with reporters,163 and all that they do to add visibility to the firm.164 
 
158 Interview with Neal Katyal, Partner, Hogan Lovells, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 2, 2015). 
See also Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1557 (“The prestige associated with an 
active Supreme Court practice also promotes an attorney’s general appellate practice before 
the lower courts, where there is no similarly limited number of cases to be briefed and ar-
gued.”). 159 Interview with Tom Goldstein, Partner, Goldstein & Russell, in Williamsburg, Va. 
(Feb. 11, 2015). It is noteworthy that this firm also sponsors SCOTUSblog. See Disclaimer, 
SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/disclaimer/ [https://perma.cc/3444-ABVH].  160 Several law firms highlight the activities of lawyers and practice groups before the Su-
preme Court. Bancroft, for example, notes arguments made, briefs filed, attorneys hired, 
and—where available—includes links to media coverage of firm activities before the Su-
preme Court. Press, Bancroft PLLC, http://www.bancroftpllc.com/blog/category/press 
[https://perma.cc/Z6YN-CD64]. The website for Gibson Dunn’s Appellate and Constitution-
al Law practice group prominently features accolades by media outlets such as Fortune, Na-
tional Law Journal, and Law 360. Appellate and Constitutional Law, Gibson Dunn, 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/practices/pages/ACL.aspx [https://perma.cc/VR6S-L7M3]. 
Latham & Watkins issued and prominently displayed a press release when the National Law 
Journal named Latham & Watkins to its “‘Appellate Hot List’ for ‘appellate advocacy at its 
strongest—winning the big cases and changing the law.’” The National Law Journal Selects 
Firm for 2015 “Appellate Hot List,” Latham & Watkins (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.lw.c
om/news/firm-named-appellate-hot-list-2015 [https://perma.cc/EYU2-EATU]. 
161 Former Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal Joins Hogan Lovells as Partner and Co-
Head of Appellate Practice, Hogan Lovells (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.hoganlovells.com/for
mer-acting-solicitor-general-neal-katyal-joins-hogan-lovells-as-partner-and-co-head-of-
appellate-practice-09-06-2011/ [https://perma.cc/KRN6-62YJ]; Paul Clement, Former So-
licitor General, Joins Bancroft PLLC, Bancroft PLLC (Apr. 25, 2011), http://online.w
sj.com/public/resources/documents/042511clementbancroft.pdf. [https://perma.cc/SXR3-TF
GU]. 162 See infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing efforts of Akin Gump to publi-
cize activities of its Supreme Court lawyers). 
163 Media Mentions & Press Releases, Akin Gump, https://www.akingump.com/en/news-
insights/index.html?action=news&dir=desc&name=&practices=241&sort=date&sub
site_id=1&newstype=6#search_results [https://perma.cc/X236-N79A].  164 Akin Gump, for example, publicizes its Supreme Court and Appellate practice group by 
including an “Articles” section on its website that includes quotes from various media out-
lets. See Supreme Court and Appellate, Akin Gump, https://www.akingump.com/en/expe 
wrience/practices/litigation/supreme-court-appellate.html [https://perma.cc/627P-Y439]; see, 
e.g., Pratik A. Shah, Akin Gump, https://www.akingump.com/en/lawyers-advisors/pratik-a-
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On occasion, moreover, the filing of an amicus brief on behalf of in-
dustry interests is helpful in establishing relationships with general 
counsels who might hire the lawyer and law firm on non-Supreme Court 
matters.165 For example, Walmart is now a client of the law firm Gibson 
Dunn because of the firm’s representation of the company in a signifi-
cant employment discrimination lawsuit before the Supreme Court.166 
Indeed, “[s]ecuring profitable, long-term relationships with America’s 
largest corporations is one reason major law firms began creating Su-
preme Court practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s.”167 
Supreme Court specialists also recruit top prospects, most notably 
highly sought-after Supreme Court clerks. The hiring of these clerks 
adds to the firms’ stature and, consequently, generates business for law 
firms.168 Law firms publicize these hires169 and do what it takes to recruit 
these prospects, including offering $300,000 signing bonuses and prom-
ises to work on Supreme Court matters with Supreme Court special-
ists—which often means the writing of amicus briefs.170 
Given the paucity of cases before the Court, amicus filings are often 
the only mechanism by which Supreme Court specialists can get their 
name and their firm’s name before the Court.171 This matters because 
their status is tied to their participation in Supreme Court litigation. 
Amicus participation is thus critically important for one to be seen as a 
 
shah.html [https://perma.cc/V53Q-EGMW]. Moreover, WilmerHale’s media-relations de-
partment has written to conference organizers about the willingness of their Supreme Court 
practitioners to participate as panelists. See Email from Neal Devins, Professor, William & 
Mary Law Sch., to Virginia Law Review (on file with Virginia Law Review Association).  165 Interview with Paul Smith, Partner, Jenner & Block, in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 2015).  166 Id.  167 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 2.  168 “In a 2012 pitch letter to a potential client,” for example, Gibson Dunn noted the num-
ber of clerks in the firm (twelve at that time, twenty-three today) and said that it knew “how 
to customize and tailor arguments to particular justices.” Id.  169 See, e.g., Jones Day Adds 10 U.S. Supreme Court Clerks in Four Offices; 29 Have 
Joined in Four Years, Jones Day (Nov. 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/jones-day-adds-10-
us-supreme-court-clerks-in-four-offices-29-have-joined-in-four-years-11-02-2015 
[https://perma.cc/H655-H7Z5].  
170 Supreme Court rules forbid clerks from working on Supreme Court cases until two 
years after the clerkship has ended. Sup. Ct. R. 7. Nonetheless, top firms seek to build their 
Supreme Court practices and advance their reputations by hiring clerks immediately after 
they leave the Court. See Biskupic et al., supra note 7; Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 
6, at 94 n.21 (noting the law firms that hired 2007–08 term clerks). 171 See Ward, supra note 9.  
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“player” in the Supreme Court world—sometimes it is the only road 
available. 
2. The Office of the Solicitor General 
The Office of the Solicitor General (“OSG”) also fuels the amicus 
machine. Even though the Solicitor General hardly ever backs a coordi-
nated amicus effort to support its positions in the Supreme Court,172 at-
torneys in the office are very much linked to the Supreme Court Bar. 
In the 2014–15 term, for example, the Solicitor General appeared in 
fifty-four of the sixty-six argued cases—twenty-one as a party and thir-
ty-three as an amicus.173 Members of the Supreme Court Bar also inter-
face with the OSG when the Court calls for the views of the Solicitor 
General as to whether cert should be granted.174 When this happens, 
counsel for petitioner and respondent typically schedule meetings with 
the OSG to pitch their position so that the government will support their 
position before the Court.175 This somewhat formal process is yet anoth-
er opportunity for Supreme Court practitioners to interface with, and 
strengthen their professional and personal connections to, OSG lawyers. 
More significantly, many members of the Bar are alumni of the Solic-
itor General’s office, and its leading members are former Solicitors 
General themselves.176 Indeed, with the notable exceptions of the Stan-
 
172 Interview with Andy Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown, in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 2015). 
See also Greenhouse, supra note 13 (observing that “[o]rdinarily, as a party in a major Su-
preme Court case, the federal government doesn’t bother to do what private parties do rou-
tinely: mobilize organizations and well-credentialed individuals to support the position from 
different perspectives in briefs filed as ‘friends of the court’”). 173 Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, Database on Solicitor General’s Participation in 
Argued Cases (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).  
174 For a general treatment of this practice, see Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of 
the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. Sup. Ct. 
Hist. 35 (2010). 175 See Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here to Help”: Obtaining 
Amicus Support from the Federal Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. App. Prac. & 
Process 209, 217 (2009); Lawrence S. Ebner, The United States as Amicus Curiae: Making 
Uncle Sam Your New Best Friend, DRIToday.com, http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=204.  176 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7. The Echo Chamber series identifies former Solicitors 
General Ted Olson, Gregory Garre, Paul Clement, Seth Waxman, and Neal Katyal as five of 
the eight advocates who appear most before the Court. See id. pt. 3; see also Janet Roberts et 
al., Special Report: In Ever-Clubbier Bar, Eight Men Emerge as Supreme Court Confidants, 
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ford Law Clinic and Goldstein & Russell,177 all leading Supreme Court 
groups are headed by alumni of the Solicitor General’s office. Five of 
the top eight are former Solicitors General and twenty-five of the top 
sixty-six Supreme Court advocates worked in the U.S. Solicitor Gen-
eral’s office.178 In other words, the amicus machine values service in the 
Solicitor General’s office and helps produce job opportunities for Solici-
tor General veterans. 
3. The Justices and Their Clerks 
Just as the Supreme Court Bar needs the Justices to hear their cases to 
stay in business and have power, the Justices want the Bar to be power-
ful because it supplies the Court with the types of legal arguments the 
Justices find most useful.179 It is a professional relationship that is self-
reinforcing. Indeed, nearly every Justice on today’s Court is on record 
supporting the Supreme Court Bar.180 For Justice Stephen Breyer, “The 
Supreme Court is not the CIA . . . I want people to know how the 
[C]ourt works.”181 For Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “If you know you 
have a solid beginning, two people making the best argument on both 
sides, that makes it less anxious for you.”182 Justices Clarence Thomas 
and Antonin Scalia each reported that the Justices would (in Thomas’s 
words) “vote against a cert petition if they think the lawyering is bad,”183 
where (in Scalia’s words) “the petition demonstrates that the lawyer is 
 
Reuters (Dec. 8, 2014, 6:19 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-advocates-
specialreport-idUSKBN0JM11E20141208 [https://perma.cc/P9K6-FHXL].  177 See Stephanie Mencimer, The Court Crasher, The Atlantic (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/the-court-crasher/309106 [https://pe
rma.cc/E43V-9FFN]; Curriculum Vitae: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford L. Sch., https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2016-Aug-resume3.pdf [https://perma.c
c/R5GG-74CB]; Curriculum Vitae: Pamela Susan Karlan, Stanford L. Sch., https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2015.KarlanCV.December1.pdf. [https://p
erma.cc/87NZ-52HU]. 
178 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pts. 1, 3.  179 Id. pt. 3.  180 Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts, and John Shiffman spoke to eight Supreme Court Justices 
(all but Chief Justice Roberts) in their study, and the results suggested strong support for a 
specialized Supreme Court Bar. See id. pt. 1. 181 Id. pt. 3. 182 Id. pt. 1. 183 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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not going to argue it well.”184 In sharp contrast, top Supreme Court law-
yers “earn respect by their performances” and that—as Justice Anthony 
Kennedy is described as putting it—“can change minds by framing a 
case or issue in ways the [J]ustices hadn’t considered.”185 For then-Judge 
John Roberts, the Supreme Court Bar was a critical counterweight to the 
“specialists” in the Office of the Solicitor General.186 
Law clerks too embrace the Supreme Court Bar. Indeed, these law 
clerks will often join the very law firms who file these briefs and work 
with the very advocates they look to for guidance.187 Thirty-one of the 
top sixty-six Supreme Court advocates are former law clerks.188 From 
2004–12, 44% of successful cert petitions were filed by former Supreme 
Court clerks, most working in top appellate practice groups.189 In the 
2012–13 term, 53% of cases featured arguments by a former clerk to a 
sitting Justice.190 
The self-reinforcing relationship between the Justices, their clerks, 
and the Supreme Court Bar (which is dominated by former clerks and 
alumni of the Office of Solicitor General) is on display in other ways—
some professional and some social. Professional ties are bolstered by the 
Supreme Court’s growing practice of appointing former clerks to serve 
as amici.191 In particular, when the Court wants to hear arguments that 
neither party will advance, it appoints an amicus to make that argu-
ment.192 All twenty-five of the most recent invitations (since January 
2016) have gone to former clerks.193  
Former clerks also interface with the Justices at clerk reunions and a 
range of social events that more broadly include members of the Su-
 
184 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 185 Id. pt. 3 (first internal quotation marks omitted). 186 Roberts, supra note 80, at 77–79. 187 Political scientist Kevin McGuire referred to this phenomenon as a “revolving door” 
from law clerking to law practice before the Court. Kevin T. McGuire, Lobbyists, Revolving 
Doors and the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 J. L. & Pol. 113, 114 (2000). 188 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1. 189 Id. pt. 2.  190 Id. pt. 3.  191 Shaw, supra note 63, at 125. 192 Devins & Prakash, supra note 30, at 866 n.29; Goldman, supra note 63, at 907 (2011). 193 Shaw, supra note 63, at 125. 
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preme Court Bar.194 These ties are deep and enduring.195 Supreme Court 
Justices, clerks, attorneys for the OSG, and elite Supreme Court practi-
tioners are part of a personal and professional network that regularly in-
terfaces with each other and in which members often wear several hats 
over time. Four current Supreme Court Justices were advocates before 
the Court, three clerked on the Supreme Court, three worked in the So-
licitor General’s office, and one was also a leading member of the Su-
preme Court Bar. Lawyers for the OSG are often former clerks and are 
often en route to the Supreme Court Bar (a group in which close to half 
of the leading members are former law clerks). 
Occasionally, these close ties reveal themselves even at oral argu-
ment. In addition to the “Carter Phillips brief” (as it was called by Jus-
tice O’Connor) in Grutter v. Bollinger as noted above, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist called Maureen Mahoney of Latham & Watkins, his former 
clerk and advocate for the University of Michigan, by her first name 
during that argument.196 In interviews with journalist Joan Biskupic, 
several Justices referred to Ted Olsen (former Solicitor General and now 
head of the Gibson Dunn Supreme Court practice group) as “Ted.”197 
And Justice Scalia responded to a question about a jocular exchange be-
tween him and Seth Waxman (former Solicitor General and head of the 
WilmerHale Supreme Court practice group) by remarking: “I know Seth 
and consider him a friend.”198  
The Supreme Court Bar, in other words, is not simply a conglomera-
tion of talented lawyers. The Bar has deep ties to the Justices through 
former clerks and other social connections. Even many of the present 
 
194 On the close personal relationships between Justices and law clerks, see generally In 
Chambers: Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices (Todd C. Peppers & Ar-
temus Ward eds., 2012); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times Mag. 
(Mar. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html?_r=0 (re-
counting story of Robin Conrad, head of litigation for the Chamber of Commerce, that 
“[w]hen Justice O’Connor was on the bench and we knew her vote was very important, we 
had a case where the opposition had her favorite clerk on the brief, so we retained her next–
favorite clerk”). 195 McGuire argues that the patterns of association within the specialized Bar make it a 
unified network. See Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Wash-
ington Community and Legal Elites, 37 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 365, 366 (1993). 196 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241).  
197 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 3. 198 Id. 
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clerks who work for the Justices have worked with members of the Bar 
as summer associates while in law school, and many of these clerks will 
return to work with members of the Bar after finishing their clerk-
ships.199 The amicus machine—the systematic orchestration of amicus 
briefs by specialists—is fueled by all of these reinforcing relationships. 
C. The New Impact of Cert Stage Amici 
There is one more aspect of the amicus machine that merits discus-
sion, and it is a point about timing. Although conventional wisdom 
among interest groups is that amicus participation begins once the Court 
agrees to take a case (which is largely a resource-driven decision),200 
Supreme Court experts know the game begins even before a cert petition 
is filed. 
As any Supreme Court practitioner will observe, getting a cert grant is 
an “[u]phill [b]attle.”201 While the number of cert petitions is increasing, 
the number of cases the Court actually takes is decreasing.202 Thus the 
name of the game for lawyers is to find ways to elevate a cert petition 
off of the big stack of petitions facing the Justices and their law clerks 
(the latter of whom play an important role in summarizing petitions and 
recommending the ones that deserve more attention from the Justices).203 
 
199 See, e.g., id. pt. 1 (discussing Neal Katyal’s experiences). 200 Adam D. Chandler, The Early Brief Gets the Worm: Liberal Groups are Ceding a Key 
Way to Influence the Supreme Court, Slate (Dec. 5, 2008, 6:55 AM), http://www.slate.c
om/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2008/12/the_early_brief_gets_the_worm.single
.html [https://perma.cc/D5Q8-W9GM] (“The ACLU has made an ‘organizational decision 
not to file cert-stage amicus briefs, except in extraordinary circumstances,’ according to Le-
gal Director Steven Shapiro, as an ‘allocation-of-resources decision.’”). See also Telephone 
Interview with Steven Shapiro, Legal Director, ACLU (Nov. 18, 2015) (noting that the 
ACLU lacks the resources to file cert-stage amicus briefs given the number of merits briefs it 
files). 201 Timothy S. Bishop et al., Tips on Petitioning for Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
The Circuit Rider (2007), at 28.  
202 Id. (“While the number of petitions filed in the Supreme Court has increased from 
roughly 4,000 in the mid-1970s to 7,496 in the 2004 Term, the number of annual grants has 
decreased from about 150 to only 80 during that same period.”) Today the Court receives 
close to 10,000 petitions every year and grants approximately 80. Robert M. Yablon, Justice 
Sotomayor and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Process, 123 Yale L.J. F. 551, 551 (2014), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-and-the-supreme-courts-certiorari-
process [https://perma.cc/E3TT-SCKQ].  203 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1523–24 (noting that many of the Justices 
have admitted they do not have the time to read every petition and instead “must and do del-
egate much of the real work of scrutinizing pleadings at the jurisdictional stage to the law 
clerks”); see also Artemus Ward & David L. Weiden, Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of 
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Cert-stage amicus briefs are one way to do just that. For a variety of 
reasons they signal that a cert petition is one to watch.204 For one thing, 
the addition of amicus briefs at the cert stage adds a striking visual effect 
—it increases the amount of bound paper on the law clerk’s desk, which 
sends a psychological message to the clerk that summarizing the case for 
the Justices is going to take some time.205 Further, the very existence of 
such a brief is evidence of one reason the Court grants cert—the case 
raises an issue of national importance and for that reason someone has 
taken the time to file an amicus brief.206 Finally, the identity of the law-
yer on the amicus brief matters. In one (anonymous) survey of Supreme 
Court law clerks, 88% of the clerks admitted that they paid careful atten-
tion to amicus briefs written by renowned attorneys.207 The clerks identi-
fied about two dozen lawyers, who, by virtue of their reputation, “would 
be read carefully.”208 In the words of one clerk, “A famous name creates 
a certain level of expectation; it is a natural human quality to look at the 
source.”209 
Thus it is now routine for an experienced Supreme Court practitioner 
to recruit an amicus brief in support of a cert petition.210 As Richard 
Lazarus describes it: 
[W]hile it is of course theoretically possible that some of these [cert 
stage] amicus briefs would be filed on their own initiative if a case is 
of potential legal significance, most are in fact filed because counsel 
for petitioner proactively alerts potential amici that a petition has been 
 
Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court 109–49 (2006) (describing the role of law 
clerks in cert-stage decision making); Ryan C. Black et al., Revisiting the Influence of Law 
Clerks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 75, 79–82 
(2014) (stating that clerks seem to have the greatest influence on the Court with respect to 
the decision to grant cert). 204 Swanson, supra note 80, at 184. “Petitions to watch” is a recurring feature on the popu-
lar SCOTUSblog. See, e.g., Kate Howard, Petitions to Watch: Conference of June 23, SCO-
TUSblog (June 22, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/petitions-to-watch-confe
rence-of-june-23/. 
205 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1528 (“The veterans know, often from per-
sonal experience based on their own clerkships at the Court, how the presence of multiple 
amicus briefs can persuade the law clerk that a case is certworthy.”). 206 Sup. Ct. R. 10 (listing reasons for the Court to grant cert). 207 See Lynch, supra note 16, at 56.  208 Id. at 54–56. 209 Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). 210 See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1525 (“[Supreme Court advocates] 
push hard for amici support . . . .”); see also Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 6, at 94.  
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filed, which is not something that would otherwise necessarily be 
known.211 
Indeed, amicus coordination efforts are so well accepted that counsel 
for petitioner and affiliated interest groups embark on email campaigns 
to journalists and others touting the number of top law firms who back 
their cause through amicus filings.212 
This early recruitment of amici is a marked change from years past. In 
the early 1990s, political scientist Kevin McGuire collected survey data 
from a sample of attorneys who represented petitioners at the Supreme 
Court during the 1987 term.213 Only 23% of those who responded said 
they had sought amicus support for their petition.214 McGuire suggests 
that it was only the most experienced lawyers who knew the importance 
of cert-stage amici.215 
That secret is now out. Jurisdictional amicus briefs have gone through 
quite a modern growth spurt. The below chart captures changes in cert-
stage amicus briefs for three different years: 1982, 2005, and 2014. A 
couple of observations stand out. 
First, although the number of paid cert petitions is decreasing over 
time, the number of amicus briefs accompanying these petitions is dra-
matically increasing: Only 6% of all petitions had amicus support in 
1982 compared to 9% in 2005 and 14% in 2014. In raw numbers this 
translates to 240 cert-stage amicus briefs in 1982, 270 such briefs in 
2005, and 476 filed in 2014—almost double the amount of cert-stage 
amici in the last decade. 
Second, the chances of obtaining a grant with a cert-stage amicus 
brief are significantly higher than the chances of obtaining a grant with-
 
211 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1528. 212 See supra note 156 (discussing press release of coordinated amicus filings in birthright 
citizenship cases). Another example of interest groups publicizing amicus filings (albeit at 
the merits stage) is the 2016 abortion case, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 
2292 (2016). See Amicus Briefs in Support of Whole Woman’s Health, Ctr. for Reprod. 
Rights (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.reproductiverights.org/document/amicus-briefs-in-support-
of-whole-womans-health; Memorandum, Amicus Filings in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole 
Show Breadth of Support for Ensuring Women Can Access a Safe & Legal Abortion, SKD 
Knickerbocker (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.ne
t/files/documents/WWH%20Amicus%20Brief%20Memo%20010516%20FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JV57-8995]. 213 Kevin T. McGuire, Amicus Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the Supreme 
Court, 47 Pol. Res. Q. 821 (1994).  
214 Id. at 825. 215 Id. at 828. 
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out one. Although we make no causation claims of course, the numbers 
are still striking. In 2014, while a petition had only about a 2% chance of 
being granted if it had no supporting amicus briefs, it was six times as 
likely—about a 12% chance—to be granted if there was at least one 
supporting amicus brief. This amicus boost to getting a grant is con-
sistent with Lazarus’s findings in 2005. As Lazarus explains: 
The odds of the Court’s granting a paid petition in absence of amicus 
support in October Term 1982 was 5%, compared to approximately 2% today. With amicus support, however, the odds jump considerably. If there was at least one amicus brief filed in support, the odds of cer-
tiorari being granted in October Term 2005 was just shy of 20%.216 
Table 2: Certiorari-Stage Amicus Briefs217 
 
CERTIORARI-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS — 
1982, 2005, 2014 
 1982 2005 2014 
1. Total paid cert petitions 1906 1523 1440 
2. Number of paid cert grants 145 58 50 
3. Percentage of all paid cert petitions 
granted 
7.61% 3.80% 3.47% 
4. Total paid cert petitions with amicus 
brief in support (percentage) 
119 
(6.24%) 
144 
(9.46%) 
204 
(14.17%) 
5. Number of paid cert grants with amicus 
brief in support (percentage of grants) N/A 
28 
(48.28%) 
25 
(50.00%) 
6. Percentage of paid cert petitions with 
amicus brief in support that were granted 
N/A 19.44% 12.25% 
7. Percentage of paid cert petitions without 
amicus briefs in support that were granted 
5% 2.18% 2.02% 
8. Total number of amicus briefs in support 
filed at cert stage 
240 270 476 
 
216 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1528. 217 The 1982 data comes from Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests 
and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1109 (1988). The 
2005 data comes from Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1528–29. Although 
Caldeira and Wright included paid briefs both in support of and against petitions, Lazarus 
only included briefs in support of petitions. The 2014 data we collected ourselves from the 
listings of the Court’s issued Orders and the Docket Search function on the Court’s website. 
To keep the data from the three terms consistent, we only searched paid petitions and we on-
ly counted amicus briefs filed in support of petitions (not against, of which there were very 
few). 
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It seems that finding amicus support at the cert stage is one of the 
most important objectives a petitioner’s lawyer can accomplish. And this 
trick of the trade is well known to Supreme Court specialists. In a recent 
empirical study, Adam Feldman and Alexander Kappner found a strong 
relationship between a high level of amicus participation at the cert stage 
and successful big-law attorneys.218 The amicus machine, as it were, 
starts its engine well before the Justices are even aware of an upcoming 
case.219 
III. BENEFITS OF THE MACHINE 
One’s initial reaction to this amicus machine may well be skepticism. 
Why should something as important as the Justices’ information re-
source be filtered through a club of elites? Indeed, Richard Lazarus 
makes this point in his influential work documenting the rise of the Su-
preme Court Bar.220 Although Lazarus concurs that better advocacy be-
fore the Court is a “positive development,” there is still “cause for con-
cern,” he says, “that the re-emergence of a dominant Supreme Court Bar 
may be skewing disproportionately the Court’s docket and rulings on the 
merits in favor of those monied interests more able to pay for such ex-
pertise.”221 Similarly, Joan Biskupic and her colleagues at Reuters worry 
that domination of the Court’s attention by Supreme Court specialists 
may have troubling consequences: “Law firms have different goals than 
advocacy groups—profit, for one—but their Supreme Court practices 
often share an ideological interest in shaping the law for clients.”222 
These criticisms have significant implications for the amicus machine: If 
amicus briefs are being shaped by the “who’s who” of the Supreme 
Court Bar, we should perhaps worry about undue influence of that group 
on the Court. 
And yet it is unwise to focus solely on the risks of the amicus ma-
chine while overlooking the rewards. Our goal now is to build the nor-
 
218 Feldman & Kappner, supra note 99, at 24. 219 Indeed, some Supreme Court specialists think the start line is even earlier by seeking 
out amicus participation in high profile federal court of appeals cases. See Interview with 
Kannon Shanmugam, Partner, Williams & Connolly, in Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 26, 2015). 220 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1491. 221 Id. at 1491, 1554. 222 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 2. 
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mative argument in favor of the amicus machine, or at least to articulate 
several benefits not previously recognized. 
We make three such claims: (1) The Solicitor General advantage—the 
special spot that office holds in the eyes of the Justices—has been dis-
persed to members of the private bar and has effectively created a 
broader reputation market. This is good because more people have repu-
tation and credibility interests to maintain, which keeps their amicus 
submissions to the Court reliable; (2) amicus participation at the cert 
stage serves as a valuable signal to law clerks in an era where circuit 
splits—the traditional dominant reason for granting cert—are less com-
mon; and (3) as long as the Court sees itself as a law declarer rather than 
a dispute resolver, it is appropriate for the Justices to educate themselves 
about the broad contours of the case, and specialized Supreme Court 
practitioners know how to do that. 
Finally, we conclude by assessing the purported costs of the amicus 
machine. We push back on the argument that the Supreme Court Bar is 
responsible for producing a pro-business Court that favors the haves 
over the have-nots. And we argue that when considering the amicus ma-
chine—warts and all—there is less reason to fret and more attributes to 
commend. 
A. Repeat Players and Reputation Markets 
Repeat advocates before the Supreme Court have long invested heavi-
ly in their reputations. As political scientists Ryan Black and Ryan Ow-
ens explain, “[u]nlike parties who will appear only one time before the 
Court, repeat players know they will need Court support in the future. 
As such, they must prepare for the future; they must concern themselves 
with it always and they must jealously protect their reputations.”223 
Chief among those repeat players with a vested interest in reputation 
are the lawyers who serve in the Office of Solicitor General, an office 
that supervises and conducts all federal litigation in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. A long line of scholars has observed what they call the SG ad-
vantage at the Court.224 Attorneys from the SG’s office—who typically 
 
223 Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, The Solicitor General and the United States Supreme 
Court: Executive Branch Influence and Judicial Decisions 35–36 (2012).  224 See id. For others who have noticed and remarked on this phenomenon, see Linda R. 
Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the 
Law, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 391, 405 (2000); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard 
Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. 
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come to the SG with sterling resumes—are more likely than others simi-
larly situated to win cases at the Court, to have cert petitions granted, 
and to have briefs cited by the Justices with approval.225 This is what led 
Lincoln Caplan to famously refer to the SG as “the Tenth Justice.”226 
With respect to amicus briefs, Justice Ginsburg has called the SG a 
“true friend of the Court.”227 Supreme Court law clerks, too, label the SG 
as a sort of “super amicus.” In one survey, approximately 70% of the 
law clerks singled out the SG as the most important amicus filer.228 One 
clerk reported, “Amicus briefs from the solicitor general are ‘head and 
shoulders’ above the rest, and are often considered more carefully than 
party briefs.”229 And, another one explained, “You may not agree with 
the solicitor general’s argument, but the amicus brief will always be well 
researched.”230 The gray brief—the color of the cover of briefs filed by 
the SG, as opposed to the green covers that other amici wear—is “the 
most important without a doubt.”231 
There are several available explanations for the SG advantage at the 
Court. While some theories emphasize the SG’s political position in 
promoting the role of the executive,232 and others stress the office’s abil-
ity to screen the cases it chooses to pursue,233 most theories highlight the 
 
Rev. 1323, 1326 (2010); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the US Su-
preme Court, 51 Pol. Res. Q. 505, 505 (1998) [hereinafter McGuire, Explaining Executive 
Success]; Jim Rossi, Does the Solicitor General Advantage Thwart the Rule of Law in the 
Administrative State?, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 459, 464 (2000); Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The 
Tenth Justice? Consequences of Politicization in the Solicitor General’s Office, 71 J. Pol. 
224, 224 (2009).  
225 In their recent book and empirical assessment, political scientists Ryan Black and Ryan 
Owens used a matching system—using lawyers and cases that are as identical as possible—
and found that the OSG lawyer is more likely to win his Supreme Court case over the simi-
larly situated non-OSG lawyer, and is also more likely to have a cert petition granted or a 
brief referenced in the decision. See Black & Owens, supra note 223, at 89–91, 111–12.  226 Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice 3–4 (1987). 227 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Thomas Jefferson Lecture: Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 
T. Jefferson L. Rev. 517, 519 (2003). 228 Lynch, supra note 16, at 46. 229 Id. at 47 (emphasis removed). 230 Id.  231 Id.; see Sup. Ct. R. 33(1)(e), (g). 232 John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in the 
Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 799, 804–05 (1982) (reviewing 
Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution—A Firsthand Account 
(1991)). 
233 Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independ-
ent Agency Litigation, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 255, 317–19 (1994); Rossi, supra note 224, at 466.  
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earned reputation and credibility of the attorneys who work in that of-
fice. 
This credibility advantage takes one of several forms. First, OSG 
lawyers are trusted by the Justices to supplement the record with “valua-
ble (and often otherwise unattainable) information about the practical 
consequences of a potential decision.”234 Second, they have earned a 
reputation for not overreaching and for furthering principles of “stabil-
ity.”235 And, relatedly, they are known for producing high-quality 
briefs—they know how to speak the language of the Court both at an in-
dividual Justice level and at an institutional level.236 
Overlooked to date, however, is the fact that these important features 
of the SG advantage no longer rest solely within the walls of the De-
partment of Justice. Young lawyers who earn their reputation within the 
OSG now depart and head to private practice.237 Gone are the days 
where an attorney spends his entire career in the OSG. As one advocate 
put it, the OSG is now the “farm team” of the future leaders of the prac-
tice.238 Roughly half of the sixty-six elite Supreme Court specialists 
highlighted by Reuters are OSG alumni.239 
This is a real change from years past.240 Solicitors General did not lit-
igate after leaving the government from 1952–81. By contrast, with the 
exception of now-Justice Elena Kagan, each of the six Solicitors General 
who served after 1996 now heads a Supreme Court litigation practice at 
 
234 Cordray & Cordray, supra note 224, at 1365 (“When the Solicitor General, acting in the 
‘tenth justice’ mode, provides the Court with valuable (and often otherwise unattainable) in-
formation about the practical consequences of a potential decision, the Solicitor General not 
only improves the Court’s decision making, but also strengthens the Court’s reliance on the 
Solicitor General.”). For an important article challenging the faith in the SG in this regard, 
see Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the 
Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1600 (2013). 
235 Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 
Ind. L.J. 1297, 1309 (2000) (“[T]he Court has come to rely on the Solicitor General to pre-
sent briefs of the most scrupulous fidelity, and to combine statements of principle with strat-
egies by which the Court may rule in a manner most consistent with principles of stability.”). 
236 See Black & Owens, supra note 223, at 39; Lynch, supra note 16, at 46–47. 237 Matt Sundquist, Analysis: Former Solicitors General and the Supreme Court Bar, 
SCOTUSblog (Mar. 4, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/03/analysis-forme
r-solicitors-general-and-the-supreme-court-bar [https://perma.cc/8ENP-MCJ3].  238 Kannon Shanmugam, Williams & Connolly, Address at William & Mary Law School: 
Supreme Court Preview 2015–16, Supreme Court Bar (Sept. 26, 2015).  
239 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1. 240 Sundquist, supra note 237 (calling the change a stark “new trend”).  
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a private firm.241 These lawyers are heavily recruited and heavily com-
pensated. When Paul Clement left the OSG to join the private sector, for 
example, he was described as the “LeBron James” or “Holy Grail” of 
law firm recruiting.242 
The implications of this change for the amicus machine are signifi-
cant. When these OSG alums later file amicus briefs in their new capaci-
ty as leaders of the Supreme Court Bar, their badge of credibility stays 
with them. Put differently, the amicus machine has capitalized on these 
earned OSG reputational and credibility benefits and dispersed them to a 
broader group, namely members of the Supreme Court Bar generally. In 
the language of corporate law, it has created a broader “reputation mar-
ket.”243 And this is a very positive development in a post-Internet world. 
As one of us has fretted about before, the interaction of the infor-
mation age and the boom of Supreme Court amicus briefs can have 
troubling consequences.244 Because today anyone can claim to be a fac-
tual expert and find information to support her view quickly and cheap-
ly, amicus briefs are not uniformly dependable sources of information. 
The Justices will sometimes cite an amicus brief for a statement of fact 
that ultimately rests on dubious authority—blog posts that no longer ex-
ist, studies that were funded by an interested group, or statements of sci-
ence from what turn out to be motivated political groups, to name a few 
examples.245 
A real benefit of the amicus machine is that the members of the Su-
preme Court Bar—often led by former OSG attorneys—have a vested 
interest in avoiding these dubious authorities. In fact not a single exam-
ple of troubling amicus facts highlighted by one of us in a prior article 
 
241 Seth Waxman heads the practice at WilmerHale; Walter Dellinger at O’Melveny; Ted 
Olson at Gibson Dunn; Paul Clement at Kirkland & Ellis; Greg Garre at Latham & Watkins; 
and Neal Katyal at Hogan Lovells. For a general treatment of the shift from Solicitors Gen-
eral into private practice, see Matthew L. Sundquist, Learned in Litigation: Former Solicitors 
General in the Supreme Court Bar, 5 Charleston L. Rev. 59 (2010). 242 Sundquist, supra note 237 (internal quotation marks omitted). 243 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1085–86 (2003). Reputation markets are extralegal 
mechanisms that constrain parties’ behavior. Reputation markets in the corporate community 
exist when there are (1) repeat players in a close knit community; (2) “shared expectations of 
what constitutes appropriate behavior”; and (3) an ability to police whether behavior con-
forms to those expectations. Id. All three features appear in the Supreme Court amicus busi-
ness.  
244 Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, supra note 25, at 1791–92. 245 Id. at 1792–95.  
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was filed by a member of the Supreme Court elite.246 Rather, these re-
peat players have formed a reputation market—an extralegal mechanism 
to constrain behavior. To protect their credibility with the Justices and 
with each other, members of the Supreme Court Bar will not engage 
with suspect authorities and overly creative claims to the Court. Indeed, 
they likely will not want to associate with those players who would. 
They have formed an economy of trust that they do not wish to be bro-
ken. 
Significantly, both the Justices and the advocates themselves can po-
lice appropriate conduct in this reputation market. Certainly, a Justice 
will expect credible sources and quality advocacy when he or she recog-
nizes a name of a Supreme Court expert on an amicus brief. For exam-
ple, Justice Anthony Kennedy lambasted a Supreme Court advocate who 
made a misstatement in an earlier case by asking at oral argument: “If 
you have repeated statements in your brief that require qualifica-
tions . . . shouldn’t we view with some skepticism what you tell us?”247 
But even when the amicus brief is signed by an outside player, yet 
wrangled by an insider, there is a reputation market at work. Supreme 
Court advocates repeat business with each other—they write briefs for 
each other, they refer clients to one another, they recruit from the same 
pool of people, and they run in the same social circles. If one of them 
“wrangles” and “whispers” to an amicus who ends up submitting unreli-
able information to the Court, the advocates will know even if the Jus-
tices will not. Over time, this sort of behavior will cost an advocate in 
terms of the way she is viewed by her peers.248 
 
246 See generally id. 247 For a re-telling of this story, see Tony Mauro, At the Supreme Court, the Seventh Time 
is not a Charm, The BLT: The Blog of LegalTimes (Jan. 14, 2008), http://legaltime
s.typepad.com/blt/2008/01/at-the-supreme.html [https://perma.cc/TS4F-PKXG].  248 Indeed, this harks of “social network theory,” a school of thought that teaches that peo-
ple in a connected community influence each others’ behavior. See Daniel J. Brass, Kenneth 
D. Butterfield & Bruce C. Skaggs, Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A Social Network 
Perspective, 23 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 14, 15 (1998). Likewise, social psychology recognizes the 
import of reputation by one’s peers, especially among elites. See Lawrence Baum & Neal 
Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 
1515, 1532–36 (2010). Specifically, the desire to be liked and respected by other people is a 
fundamental psychological motivation, and self-esteem depends heavily on the esteem in 
which one is held by others. See, e.g., Rick H. Hoyle et al., Selfhood: Identity, Esteem, Reg-
ulation 31–35 (1999); Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for 
Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 Psychol. Bull. 497, 
497 (1995).  
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Thus, to the extent one is concerned with “junk science” in amicus 
briefs, leveraging the credibility interests of the Supreme Court Bar is a 
way to mitigate that worry. Put differently, part of the SG advantage has 
now been dispersed to a broader group. Just as the law clerks say they 
are attracted to the gray brief (from the OSG) because it is trustworthy 
and well-researched,249 so too do the Justices pay more attention to the 
amicus briefs facilitated by members of the Supreme Court Bar.250 In-
deed, the litigation advantage of the SG “disappears completely” when 
the OSG goes head to head with equally experienced members of the 
Supreme Court Bar.251 In cases pitting the OSG against members of the 
Supreme Court Bar (from October Term 2004 to October Term 2010), 
the Supreme Court Bar lawyers prevailed in 65.2% of their cases as peti-
tioners and 57.1% as respondents.252 
And while certainly this puts more power in the hands of elite advo-
cates, that dynamic is nothing new. Attorneys in the OSG have long 
since cornered the market on reputation interests. They alone could be 
trusted to supplement the factual record. They alone had the track record 
of avoiding overreaching. They were the ones with the expertise in 
speaking Supreme Court language and knowing the right angles to press. 
Now those advantages are shared by a wider group through the amicus 
machine. And the Justices (and their decisions) are all the better for it. 
B. Amicus Briefs Are Important Signals at the Cert Stage 
A second benefit of the machine emerges from the activity around the 
Court’s discretionary jurisdiction. As demonstrated above, amicus activ-
ity when the Court is considering granting cert has grown significantly 
(nearly doubling) in the past ten years.253 This tracks the intuition of the 
advocates we spoke to from the Supreme Court Bar. The conventional 
wisdom now is that amicus support at the cert stage is a necessity, not a 
luxury.254 
 
249 See Lynch, supra note 16, at 46–47. 250 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1. 251 McGuire, supra note 224, at 515. 252 Fisher, supra note 97, at 155. In the same period, nonspecialists pitted against the OSG 
won 43.5% of their cases as petitioner and just 9.1% as respondent. See id. 
253 See supra note 217 and Table 2. As discussed above, a 2014 paid petition had a 2% 
chance of being granted without amicus support and a 12% chance with at least one amicus 
brief. 254 See Interview with Jeffrey L. Fisher, Professor and Co-Dir., Stanford Law Sch. Su-
preme Court Litig. Clinic, in Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 25, 2015); Interview with Andy 
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When spotting this trend ten years ago, Richard Lazarus assigned re-
sponsibility for this uptick to the Supreme Court Bar elites: “The veter-
ans know, often from personal experience based on their own clerkships 
at the Court, how the presence of multiple amicus briefs can persuade 
the law clerk that a case is certworthy. They also possess the connec-
tions within the Supreme Court Bar itself to get the briefs filed.”255 
Lazarus argues that this influence of the Supreme Court Bar on the 
Court’s agenda is not desirable. He warns that the current Court’s “pro-
business shift” is attributable to the rise of the Bar and specifically to its 
efforts with amicus briefs at the cert stage.256 “What the private Supreme 
Court bar has accomplished,” Lazarus warns, “is to persuade the Court 
to enter into areas of law of interest to the regulated community to cor-
rect what business perceives as problematic legal doctrine.”257 
We push back on Lazarus’s claims of causation between the Bar and 
the Court’s business shift below. But even acknowledging the risk of 
undue influence of the private sector, there is another side of the amicus 
machine at the cert stage that is actually quite beneficial and so far un-
recognized: These briefs serve as a useful signal to law clerks in an era 
where circuit splits—the historic indicator of a case’s importance—are 
far less common. 
Supreme Court Rule 10 lists the reasons for the Court to exercise its 
jurisdictional discretion in taking up a case. The reasons include: to set-
tle conflicting decisions among the federal circuit courts, to correct a de-
parture by a state court of last resort on an important issue of federal 
law, or to answer an important federal question of national signifi-
cance.258 
Of these factors, the first one—known commonly as the “circuit 
split”—by far “stands out as the most important” reason the Court takes 
a case.259 Indeed, as one commentator writes, “the experienced Supreme 
Court practitioner will ‘[s]acrifice everything necessary to make the 
 
Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown, in Wash., D.C. (June 16, 2015); Interview with Carter Phil-
lips, Partner, Sidley Austin, in Williamsburg, Va. (Feb. 28, 2012). 
255 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1522–28. Although the trend of amicus 
practice at the cert stage is growing and relatively new, the idea that experienced Supreme 
Court litigators are more successful in getting petitions for their clients granted is not new. 
See McGuire, supra note 80, at 195. 256 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1531–32. 257 Id. 258 Sup. Ct. R. 10. 259 Swanson, supra note 80, at 183. 
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point [in the petition] that [the] case is an ideal vehicle to resolve an in-
disputable circuit split.’”260 Not surprisingly, Supreme Court law clerks 
watch for splits with myopic focus. They see circuit splits as the “driv-
ing force” behind the Court’s rare decision to grant cert.261 
As is widely known, Supreme Court law clerks have a special role to 
play in the cert process. Because the Justices do not have the time to re-
view 10,000 petitions (not to mention response briefs), they depend on 
law clerks to review and summarize the petitions and to make recom-
mendations on whether the Justices should vote to grant or deny them.262 
But there is a strong inertia working against a law clerk—usually in their 
mid-twenties and newly minted from law school—in recommending a 
cert grant. As political scientist H.W. Perry, Jr. describes it, the law 
clerks approach each petition with a “presumption against a grant.”263 
One clerk told Perry, “We saw our role as clerks to find every reason 
possible to deny cert. petitions.”264 
Historically, the most “certworthy” reason—the one most likely to de-
feat the law clerk presumption—was a true circuit split.265 Seventy per-
cent of the Court’s most recent docket involved cases that have split the 
Courts of Appeals.266 The presence of a conflict among the circuits “re-
mains by far the most important criteria in the Court’s case selection.”267 
And it is something the law clerks can identify. Supreme Court law 
clerks, though among the youngest members of the legal profession, are 
 
260 Id. at 183 n.55 (alterations in original) (quoting Tony Mauro, Apprentice Appellants: 
Why the High Court is Now Reading Student Papers, 26 Am. Lawyer 75, 76 (June 2004)). 
261 H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme 
Court 246 (1991). For his book, Perry interviewed five Justices and sixty-four former Su-
preme Court law clerks who served during the 1976–80 Terms. Id. at 9.  262 Beginning in 1972 (at the suggestion of Justice Powell), the Justices have divided cert 
petitions equally among the chambers who choose to participate in what is called “the cert 
pool.” For those chambers who join the pool (typically seven or eight), one law clerk will 
author a memo for every Justice in the pool summarizing the petition’s claims and recom-
mending whether the Court vote to grant or deny it. Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy 
Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, and Ideology in the Supreme Court, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
101, 117–18 (2009). 263 Perry, supra note 261, at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 264 Id. See also Tony Mauro, The Hidden Power Behind the Supreme Court: Justices Give 
Pivotal Role to Novice Lawyers, USA Today, Mar. 13, 1998, at 1A (observing that law 
clerks are predisposed against recommending grants of cert petitions). 265 Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1631–34 (2008). 266 Id. at 1575. 267 Id. at 1632. 
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very adept at spotting circuit splits and at sorting the true divisions in the 
courts from the so-called “illusory splits” manufactured by the parties.268  
But the circuit split is fading in relevance today. Justices Breyer and 
Souter have both speculated publicly that the reason for the Court’s 
shrinking docket has to do with fewer circuit splits and greater “homo-
geneity” in the courts of appeals.269 The empirical evidence on this ques-
tion is mixed, but there is at least some support for the claim that circuit 
splits are less common in a world in which the lower courts have greater 
access to one another’s opinions and the emphasis on regulation leads to 
controversies focused on one jurisdiction.270 
If true that the circuit split is a dying breed,271 then how are the law 
clerks to know which split-less cases are certworthy? It is here that the 
amicus machine has a positive influence. 
As demonstrated above, members of the Supreme Court Bar are key 
to an increase in amicus practice at the cert stage. Compared to the rest 
of the field, they are better positioned to seek these briefs out. They rec-
ognize certworthy issues in advance (while the case is in the lower 
court), they know what makes one case a better vehicle than another, 
and they are keenly aware of the value of amicus briefs in demonstrating 
a petition’s importance.272 Referring to Supreme Court specialists, Jus-
tice Kennedy has explained, “They basically are just a step ahead of us 
 
268 Carter G. Phillips, Providing Strategies for Success: Petitioning the Supreme Court for 
Certiorari, 46 For the Def., Apr. 2004, at 22, 24 (“Law clerks are very adept at reading peti-
tions and lower court opinions and deciding whether the asserted conflict among the lower 
courts is more apparent than real.”). 269 Frost, supra note 265, at 1636 (attributing this speculation to the Justices, but noting 
skepticism that the evidence exists to support it). 
270 See Robert Barnes, Roberts Supports Court’s Shrinking Docket, Wash. Post (Feb. 2, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/01/AR20070201022
13.html (recognizing that the Court hears fewer cases now than in the past and noting that 
online databases make circuit splits less common).  271 It may also be the case that the circuit split is overvalued and that more attention should 
be paid to a case’s significance. Professor Amanda Frost, for example, has called attention to 
the fact that there are plenty of questions the Court decides each year—say, for example, 
whether a typewritten name on a notice of appeal should satisfy the signature requirement—
that are not issues of national importance and are only taken up by the Court because of the 
existence of disagreement among the circuits. See Frost, supra note 265, at 1569. 272 See Feldman & Kappner, supra note 99, at 23; Phillips, supra note 268, at 23 (recogniz-
ing that arguing that one’s case is nationally important as a “lonely petitioner” can be diffi-
cult; Phillips says it is “always very important to have ‘friends’” at the cert stage and “the 
more friends the petitioner has the better”). 
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in identifying the cases that we’ll take a look at . . . . They are on the 
front lines and they apply the same standards” as the Justices.273 
The cert-stage amicus brief—a “must have” for players in the know—
is thus a powerful signal to law clerks that a case is important—
important enough that someone took the time to write an amicus brief 
about it.274 It is an efficient way to convey that information quickly in a 
cert process that values speed.275 And although it is fair to worry, as 
Lazarus does, about the tool being misused by private interests,276 it is 
also a mistake to overlook the positive side of this development.277 
Many people complain that the modern Supreme Court is not taking 
enough cases and, in fact, is taking the wrong ones—trivial circuit splits 
and not issues that truly merit national uniformity.278 According to Pro-
fessor Fred Schauer, this is a new development and not a welcome one: 
“[A]s the Court’s docket shrinks, it is also deciding fewer legally im-
portant cases, a recent and unfortunate change from past practice.”279 
There is a growing gap, he argues, between what issues the public thinks 
 
273 See Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 274 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1522, 1526. 275 See Perry, supra note 261, at 119–20 (“[I]n the cert. process, much information must be 
conveyed, and there exists a need to reduce time and effort in processing information . . . .”). 276 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1532; see also Lazarus, Docket Capture, 
supra note 6, at 89, 96 (expressing concern about “disproportionate influence that the expert 
Supreme Court Bar exerts on the content of the Court’s plenary docket”).  277 It is also important to recognize that the Justices can—and do—take steps that mitigate 
the risks of a law clerk being snookered by a Supreme Court specialist into thinking that a 
case is a good vehicle to resolve an important legal question. For example, over the past sev-
eral years, the Justices increasingly re-list cases before granting cert. “The data suggests that 
a relist . . . is, indeed, now almost a necessary condition for review . . . .” Michael Kimberly 
& Kristin Liska, The Statistics of Relists, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 14, 2015, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/09/the-statistics-of-relists [https://perma.cc/EK56-KAAD] 
(documenting that re-lists had been used for all October Term 2015 cert grants and in 84% of 
October Term 2014 grants). By re-listing cases, the Justices can ask for a second cert pool 
memo and take other steps to confirm that a case is, in fact, a good vehicle for Supreme 
Court review. 278 See Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certi-
fication?, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1310 (2010) (“Complaints about the Supreme 
Court’s current certiorari practices are legion. Broadly speaking, these objections tend to re-
duce to two general assertions: first, the Court is taking too few cases; and second, the Court 
is not taking the ‘right’ cases.”). 
279 Frederick Schauer, Is It Important to Be Important?: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s 
Case-Selection Process, 119 Yale L.J. 77, 77 (2009). 
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are important and the issues the Court actually chooses to decide.280 If 
this criticism is true, the concentration of power in the Supreme Court 
Bar can once again be a mitigating tool. Through the coordinated filing 
of cert-stage amicus briefs, the machine is generating a valuable signal 
to law clerks (who need it) that a case is worthy of the Justices’ atten-
tion. 
A signal is only dangerous if it is not accurate. And, although of 
course not a perfect signal, a cert-stage amicus brief can accurately 
demonstrate importance. As Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court counsel for 
the National Association of Attorneys General, explains, a cert-stage 
amicus brief is able to “add a deeper appreciation of the importance of 
the case.”281 These briefs stress, for example, the harm to third parties if 
the law remains uncertain, the consequences for an industry if the lower 
court opinion remains intact, and the unintended practical consequences 
that may result if the scope of the opinion in question is not clarified.282 
These facets of a petition may not be obvious to a law clerk, and they are 
arguably far more indicative of a case’s importance than the standard 
signal of the circuit split. 
Perhaps most obviously but also most importantly, the sheer fact that 
many entities sign a brief and ask for cert indicates that the case is sig-
nificant.283 If, as Schweitzer argues, “for example, more than twenty 
sovereign states urge the Court to hear a case, this lets the Court know 
that the matter is genuinely important—that it is, indeed, one of the few 
cases so important that it warrants taking up the Court’s time.”284 
 
280 Id. at 80 (“When importance is measured by what the public and their elected repre-
sentatives think is important, therefore, and by what the government actually works on, the 
Supreme Court’s docket seems surprisingly peripheral.”). 281 Dan Schweitzer, Fundamentals of Preparing a United States Supreme Court Amicus 
Brief, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 523, 529 (2003). 
282 Id. at 530. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and Scheidler v. National Or-
ganization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003), are two interesting examples that under-
score the value of a cert-stage amicus brief. Neither case presented a circuit split, but both 
petitions were accompanied by amicus briefs signed by multiple states urging the Court to 
grant cert to resolve multiple practical problems (state prison systems in City of Boerne and 
chilling effects on social movements in Scheidler). See Brief of the Amici Curiae States of 
Ohio et al. in Support of Petitioner at 1, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (No. 95-2074); Brief of 
the States of Ala. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 18–20, Scheidler, 547 
U.S. 9 (Nos. 04-1244, 04-1352).  
283 Schweitzer, supra note 281, at 528. 284 Id.  
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Moreover, because Supreme Court specialists often craft the cert peti-
tion and solicit cert-stage amicus briefs, this package is likely to both be 
high quality and to focus on issues of import to the Justices. In fact, the 
reputation market discussed above in the context of merits-stage amicus 
briefs applies with equal force to the cert stage. Supreme Court special-
ists—people who want to guard their reputation with the Justices—are 
not likely to put their names on a meritless cert petition. Thus, the law 
clerk inclination to hone in on the petitions filed by experts may not be 
such a bad tendency. 
Finally, it is critical to remember that the cert-stage amicus brief does 
not guarantee that the Justices will grant cert in any given case. Alt-
hough the brief may indicate a “closer look” (in the words of H.W. Per-
ry) from the law clerks and the Justices, the ultimate decision to grant 
cert in a case is so multifarious it would be a mistake to think the Justic-
es are granting cases just because a member of the Bar told them to.285 
Indeed, the numbers bear this out. Although the number of cert-stage 
amicus briefs has nearly doubled since 2005, the grant rate for these pe-
titions has not doubled, but actually slightly decreased (from 19% in 
2005 to 12% in 2014).286 There thus seems to be a bit of a glass ceiling 
on the effectiveness of cert-stage amicus briefs: They certainly increase 
the petition’s chances of being granted, but there is a limit to their influ-
ence. 
C. The System Serves a Law-Declarer Court 
The final benefit of the amicus machine is the way it suits the modern 
Court’s turn towards law declaration. As others have remarked at length, 
today’s Supreme Court sees itself more as a law declarer rather than a 
dispute resolver.287 Amicus briefs filed by Supreme Court specialists 
help the Justices enunciate those broad legal rules. 
The law declaration model emphasizes that adjudication is about “ar-
ticulating public norms as well as settling private disputes”288 and, relat-
edly, that “judges serve a dual role: they must resolve the concrete dis-
putes before them, and . . . are also expected to make accurate 
 
285 Perry, supra note 261, at 120. 286 See supra Table 2. 287 See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 30, at 668–69. 288 Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Be-
tween Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1273, 1275 
(1995).  
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statements about the meaning of law that govern beyond the parameters 
of the parties and their dispute.”289 By way of contrast, the dispute reso-
lution model emphasizes party control and sees the judicial role as lim-
ited to settling only legal and factual disputes between the parties; con-
sequently, “[i]f the parties agree on a proposition, that proposition simp-
simply is not in dispute” and a court should neither raise issues sua 
sponte nor enlist amici to make legal arguments that one or the other 
party is unwilling to make.290 
We take no position on the normative desirability of the law declara-
tion model.291 Nonetheless, it is clear that the Roberts Court favors this 
model. Evidence for this shift can be seen by the Court’s willingness to 
appoint amici curiae to argue issues raised by the Justices,292 its in-
creased tendency to call for the views of the Solicitor General on wheth-
er to grant cert,293 its extra-record fact finding through amicus briefs and 
Internet searches,294 its habit of raising issues sua sponte and related dec-
larations of principles of law that are broader than necessary to resolve 
the dispute at hand,295 its increasing practice of deciding (and not avoid-
ing) constitutional controversies,296 and its effort to rein in federal courts 
of appeals by mandating their adherence to Supreme Court precedent by 
forbidding “anticipatory overrulings.”297 
 
289 Frost, supra note 265, at 452. 290 Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1191, 1219 (2011). 291 For an article defending the traditional adversarial model, see id. at 1223–24. For arti-
cles defending the law declaration model, see Frost, supra note 265, at 447; Gorod, supra 
note 30, at 39–40. 292 Unlike earlier Courts, the Roberts Court “has made an unusually high number of ap-
pointments,” reflecting the notion that it sees itself as a law declarer and is willing to use a 
broad array of tools to pursue that task. Shaw, supra note 63, at 120. 293 Devins & Prakash, supra note 30, at 861. 294 See Gorod, supra note 30, at 36 (discussing amicus briefs); Larsen, Confronting Su-
preme Court Fact Finding, supra note 25, at 1260 (discussing Internet searches); Larsen, The 
Trouble with Amicus Facts, supra note 25, at 1778 (discussing amicus briefs).  295 See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 730 (“The Court’s newly acquired freedom allows 
it—not the litigants—to shape the disputes before it.”). For discussions of whether the Su-
preme Court can raise issues sua sponte, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have 
Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 287, 301 (2000); Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored 
the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251, 257 (2000).  
296 Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-avoidance by the Roberts Court, 
2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 182–84; Monaghan, supra note 30, at 668–69. 297 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal 
Courts, and the Nature of “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 967, 969 (2000); see also Rich-
ard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How 
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Supreme Court advocates are adept at understanding the Justices’ 
embrace of law declaration and, with it, the types of arguments that will 
matter to them, both at the cert stage and on the merits.298 These briefs 
contain critical factual claims and legal arguments, and there are numer-
ous examples of the “Court relying heavily on novel legal arguments 
raised [in these briefs] . . . sometimes even on a verbatim basis.”299 At 
oral argument, moreover, Supreme Court specialists speak the Justices’ 
language. According to Paul Clement (former Solicitor General, then 
head of the appellate practice at Bancroft, and now Partner at Kirkland 
& Ellis): “There are definite ways that the justices want their questions 
answered . . . . If you know that, you can tailor your answers and pre-
sumably have better effect.”300 
Another advantage Supreme Court advocates have over their nonspe-
cialist counterparts is their ability to strategize and identify what Dan 
Schweitzer calls “the surprising source” amici.301 Amicus briefs can be 
powerful “because they are written by entities that one would expect to 
be supporting the other side of the case.”302 One example of a surprising 
source amicus should be familiar: the military amicus brief or “Carter 
Philips” brief supporting affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger.303 In 
Grutter, military leaders made the (surprising to some) claim that af-
firmative action in law schools was critical to a successful military lead-
ership.304 As previously noted, this brief played a significant role both at 
oral argument and in the ultimate opinion.  
 
Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 Emory L.J. 779, 784 (2012) (explaining how the 
Supreme Court has moved away from express anticipatory overrulings in recent years). 
298 Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts, and John Shiffman recount the experiences of two non-
specialists who recently had cases before the Court. One refused to cede oral argument to an 
insider but allowed former Solicitor General Seth Waxman to sit next to him at oral argu-
ment. Waxman “passed [him] notes” during argument and that some of the “justices ap-
peared piqued when [the nonspecialist] did not directly answer their questions.” Biskupic et 
al., supra note 7, pt. 3. The other lawyer—around one week before the brief was due—ceded 
control to Supreme Court specialist David Frederick, who, according to the nonspecialist, 
“quickly redrafted the brief in a way ‘that took it to a whole new level.’” Id.  
299 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1542; see also infra notes 112–16 and ac-
companying text (noting role of amicus briefs by Supreme Court specialists in advancing 
factual claims).  300 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 301 Schweitzer, supra note 281, at 534 (capitalization omitted).  302 Id. 303 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003). 304 Id. 
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Another, less familiar example of a surprising source is the amicus 
brief from states in the FTC v. Phoebe Putney antitrust case a few terms 
ago.305 Phoebe Putney was a case about whether Georgia could set up a 
monopoly for public services, consistent with federal antitrust law. 
Twenty states made the surprising move to come in as amici supporting 
the FTC.306 In their brief, they asked for clarity and warned of “signifi-
cant, negative consequences” that would follow from the lower court 
opinion.307 Like the brief in Grutter, this amicus brief was brought up by 
Justice Kagan at oral argument and then cited as significant by Justice 
Sotomayor in her opinion for the Court.308 Both briefs were conceived, 
recruited, and authored by members of the Supreme Court Bar.309 They 
are further examples that the sophisticated specialists know how to make 
an impact with an amicus pen. 
As the following table reveals, amicus briefs written by Supreme 
Court specialists or filed in support of a Supreme Court specialist (not 
counting the SG)310 were referenced in oral arguments thirty-four times 
from 2009 to 2014—roughly half of the times an amicus brief was ever 
mentioned. This means the “Carter Philips brief” and the “Walter 
Dellinger brief” are not one-offs. Overall, Supreme Court specialists are 
either writing or coordinating the writing of influential amicus briefs in a 
significant percentage of cases. 
 
 
 
305 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). 306 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Ill. et al. for Petitioner, Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. 
1003 (No. 11-1160), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/suprem
e_court_preview/briefs/11-1160_petitioneramcu20states.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4X95-Q78D]. 
307 Id. at 4. 308 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (No. 11-
1160), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-1160.pdf. [htt
ps://perma.cc/96S9-GJAB]; Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1016.  309 The military brief (or “Carter Phillips brief”), as noted above, was recruited by the par-
ties and authored by attorneys at Sidley Austin. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
The state brief in Phoebe Putney was authored by Michael A. Scodro, then the SG for Illi-
nois (now at Jenner & Block). See Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner States of Ill. et al., 
Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013) (No. 11-1160), http://www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-1160_petitioneramcu20state
s.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WMG-KMWY]; Overview: Michael A. Scodro, Jen-
ner & Block, https://jenner.com/people/MichaelScodro [https://perma.cc/2DH2-NMQ4].  
310 Amicus briefs filed by the OSG are perhaps mentioned at oral argument for other rea-
sons, so they were not included in this count. 
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Table 3: Amicus Briefs Referenced by Supreme Court Justices311 
 
Year 
Total number of oral 
arguments in which a 
Justice mentions an 
amicus brief 
Oral arguments in 
which a Justice  
mentions a brief filed 
by or in support of a  
specialist 
Percentage 
2009 18 9 50%  
2010 19 8 80%  
2011 11 7 63.64% 
2012 3 1 33.33% 
2013 6 4 66.67% 
2014 10 5 50% 
2009-
2014 67 34 50.75%  
 
It makes sense that a Court that sees itself as a law declarer should fa-
vor Supreme Court insiders as opposed to their local nonspecialized 
counterparts (attorneys who take a case from beginning all the way up to 
the Supreme Court). While the adversarial model gives the parties con-
trol to define the factual and legal issues (something a nonspecialist 
would be perfectly comfortable doing), the law declaration model is ask-
ing the local lawyer to do something he is not used to doing. Supreme 
Court insiders are attuned to presenting the types of arguments and facts 
that the Justices care about—they know the Court’s language and they 
know the Court’s goals. 
They know, in other words, which briefs will matter at the end of the 
day. In fact, of the twenty-one cases last term where a nongovernmental 
amicus brief was cited by a Justice in an opinion, twelve of them were 
filed by Supreme Court specialists. That number rises to fourteen if one 
also looks at the “sponsor” of the brief, the party for whom the brief was 
 
311 For this search, we combed through oral argument transcripts and identified every ami-
cus brief that was mentioned by a Justice at oral argument. We omitted ones that were 
brought up by counsel or were filed by the SG. The phrase “Supreme Court specialists” on 
this chart includes elite lawyers highlighted by Reuters in Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 3, 
and briefs filed by the State SG’s Office. The phrase “filed by or in support of” means a Su-
preme Court specialist was counsel of record for either the amicus itself or the party in 
whose support the brief was filed. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, Database of Amicus 
Briefs Mentioned by Justices at Oral Argument (on file with the Virginia Law Review Asso-
ciation).  
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filed. Thus 66% of all amicus briefs that made it into a Supreme Court 
opinion last year came from someone who was an expert in knowing 
what the Justices are interested in learning. 
Against this backdrop, it comes as no surprise that the Justices think 
the amicus machine is a good development. Chief Justice Roberts, in an 
article commenting on the rise of the Supreme Court Bar generally, ar-
gues that “things have changed, and for the better.”312 Part of his argu-
ment includes the fact that the sophisticated Bar provides “better advo-
cates” and “amicus help.”313 He is not the only member of the Court to 
take this view. Most Supreme Court Justices have publicly embraced the 
Supreme Court Bar, welcoming the change they have witnessed in Su-
preme Court advocacy. We have already noted several supportive com-
ments and here are two more: Justice John Paul Stevens, referring to the 
members of the machine, said “They earn respect by their performances. 
And because they have respect, they are more successful. I am not aware 
of any downside.”314 And Justice Thomas said, speaking laudably of Su-
preme Court specialist Ted Olson, “You want to hear what Ted has to 
say.”315 
D. Assessing the Costs and Benefits of the Machine 
The benefits of the amicus machine are substantial, especially to a 
Court that embraces the law declaration model. But one can only appre-
ciate the benefits of the amicus machine when compared to its costs. 
Those who have written about the Supreme Court Bar to date have em-
phasized these costs in their analysis, and it is to those concerns that we 
now turn. 
The chief complaint noted by journalists (Joan Biskupic and Jeff 
Rosen), advocates (Richard Lazarus and Jeff Fisher), and political scien-
tists (Kevin McGuire) is that the Supreme Court Bar serves the well-to-
do, especially business interests.316 Correspondingly, the worry is both 
(1) that the Supreme Court elite have “captured” the Court’s docket and 
 
312 Roberts, supra note 80, at 78. 313 Id. 314 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 315 Id. 316 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 97, at 142; Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 6, at 89; 
Kevin T. McGuire, The Supreme Court Bar: Legal Elites in the Washington Community 5 
(1993); Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1; Rosen, supra note 194, pt. IV.  
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pushed the Court in a business-oriented direction;317 and (2) that “the 
corporate tilt of the [C]ourt’s specialty bar leaves consumers and work-
ers with a smaller pool of top attorneys”318 so that “the progressive an-
tagonists of big business are understandably feeling beleaguered and 
outgunned.”319 
We push back against both of these claims. First, we are skeptical of 
the causal link between the rise of the Supreme Court Bar and the 
Court’s pro-business shift. We think the Court’s embrace of business in-
terests is principally connected to the jurisprudential preferences of the 
Justices and not the advocacy of the Supreme Court Bar. Second, we 
think that the resource advantage of business interests relative to indi-
vidual interests is real but significantly overstated—particularly at the 
merits stage. Excellent Supreme Court specialists can be found on both 
sides of the dispute. The amicus machine, in other words, serves both 
business and nonbusiness interests. 
To start, we are suspicious of claims that the Roberts Court has been 
“captured” by the talented lawyers of the Supreme Court Bar. That ar-
gument has the cart before the horse. Instead, the evidence points in the 
opposite direction—the Justices on the Roberts Court are especially con-
servative, and especially pro-business; elite Supreme Court lawyers 
(whether they represent business or individual interests) are actually tak-
ing their signals from the Roberts Court. 
A study of around 1,800 business decisions from 1946 to 2011 reveals 
that the five most conservative members of today’s Court are among the 
ten most pro-business Justices from that sixty-five-year period.320 The 
two Justices of all time most likely to favor business are Justice Alito 
and Chief Justice Roberts.321 A 2013 study of the Roberts Court likewise 
reveals that the Court’s five most conservative Justices voted nearly 
lockstep with the position of the Chamber of Commerce in 5–4 deci-
sions; the five conservatives backed the Chamber in 82% of these cases 
 
317 Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 6, at 89 (“The same way that powerful economic 
interests can capture an agency . . . so too may the . . . economic interests that know best how 
to influence the decisionmaking of the Justices . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).  318 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 2. 319 Rosen, supra note 194, pt. IV.  320 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1449, 1452 (2013). 321 Id.  
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(whereas liberal Justices sided with the Chamber 19% of the time).322 
Studies published in the popular press also speak to the Roberts Court’s 
proclivity to back business interests.323 There is no reason to believe that 
the Court’s pro-business bent would not exist but for the Supreme Court 
Bar telling it which cases to take. 
Going hand in glove with its support for business, the Roberts Court 
is comparatively hostile to individual claims brought on behalf of labor 
as well as civil rights and civil liberties groups. Political science and 
other measures of the Justices’ ideologies and tendencies on individual-
rights cases underscore that the Roberts Court is particularly conserva-
tive, especially the five conservative Justices who tend to back business 
interests. Tables 4 and 5 make this point. Table 4 looks at two conven-
tional measures of ideology—percentage of conservative votes in cases 
and Martin-Quinn scores (a scoring system devised by political scien-
tists where positive scores suggest a Justice is conservative and negative 
scores suggest a Justice is liberal).324 This table reveals that all five con-
servatives reach conservative outcomes in at least 56% of cases (as 
compared to 43% for the most moderate of the liberal Justices) and that 
each has a positive Martin-Quinn score (whereas all liberals have nega-
tive scores).325 Table 5 looks at the proportion of liberal votes in civil-
 
322 Doug Kendall & Tom Donnelly, Not So Risky Business: The Chamber of Commerce’s 
Quiet Success Before the Roberts Court – An Early Report for 2012-2013, Constitutional 
Accountability Ctr. (May 1, 2013), http://theusconstitution.org/text-history/1966/not-so-
risky-business-chamber-commerces-quiet-success-roberts-court-early-report. This report is 
arguably biased, but the data on whether the Justices voting did or did not back Chamber of 
Commerce filings is unassailable. 
323 See Corporations and the Court, The Economist, June 25, 2011, at 75; Simon Lazarus, 
The Stealth Corporate Takeover of the Supreme Court, New Republic (Nov. 18, 2015), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/123984/the-stealth-corporate-takeover-of-the-supreme-court; 
Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2010, 
at A1; Alicia Mundy & Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, Justices to Weigh Right to Sue, Wall 
St. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at B1; Rosen, supra note 194, pt. IV. But see Jonathan H. Adler, Busi-
ness and the Roberts Court Revisited (Again), Volokh Conspiracy (May 6, 2013, 11:20 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2013/05/06/business-and-the-roberts-court-revisited-again/ (arguing that 
the Roberts court is not necessarily pro-business in the environmental context). 
324 The procedure for calculating the score was first set out in a 2002 article and is widely 
used in research on the Supreme Court. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic 
Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court 1953–
1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134, 137–45 (2002).  325 Another scoring system devised by Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner 
claims that today’s conservatives are among the most conservative Justices ever to sit on the 
Court. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Federal 
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 108–09 (2013). 
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liberties cases and shows that all conservatives have scores below 50% 
and all liberals have scores above 50%.  
Table 4: Percentage of Conservative Votes in Cases and Martin-
Quinn Scores, 2010–14 Terms326  
Justice Percentage of Conservative 
Votes 
Martin-Quinn Scores 
Thomas 62.7 3.14 
Alito 62.8 1.81 
Scalia 56.9 1.76 
Roberts 56 0.99 
Kennedy 52.9 0.17 
Breyer 42.1 -1.41 
Kagan 36.6 -1.53 
Ginsburg 35.9 -2.31 
Sotomayor 36.2 -2.05 
 
Table 5: Percentages of Liberal Votes in Civil Liberties Cases327  
Terms 2005–06 2007–08 2009–10 2011–12 2013–14 
Ginsburg 62.5 71.4 60.2 67.1 67.1 
Breyer 61.3 63.9 55.1 52.4 66.7 
Sotomayor —— —— 61.9 65.9 69.9 
Kagan —— —— 59.4 66.2 63.9 
Kennedy 35.0 41.0 45.9 45.7 47.9 
Alito 24.1 31.0 30.5 21.0 37.0 
Scalia 26.3 33.3 39.8 32.9 41.1 
Thomas 22.5 21.4 31.6 24.4 31.5 
Roberts 26.9 35.7 41.2 31.7 47.9 
 
326 The 2010–14 terms were selected because Elena Kagan joined the Court in its 2010 
term and Justice Antonin Scalia died during the 2015 term. The database used for calculating 
percentage of conservative or liberal votes is archived at http://scdb.wustl.edu/. We analyzed 
cases decided after oral argument (decision type = 1, 6, or 7). The criteria for coding votes as 
liberal or conservative are described at http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?va
r=decisionDirection [https://perma.cc/LH9Q-N3Z5]. Results of Calculations for Percentage 
of Conservative Votes (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Martin-Quinn 
scores are archived at http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php. We use the mean estimated 
score for each Justice in a term, as recommended in the archive.  
327 Table 5 is drawn from widely used political science measures and is available at 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (results on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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Supreme Court specialists are well aware that a majority of the Justic-
es are generally sympathetic to business claims and hostile to civil-
liberties claims. These preferences are signaled by the Justices to the 
Bar, not the other way around. Justices “shape their dockets by encour-
aging potential litigants to bring particular cases or make specific argu-
ments.”328 They communicate these preferences through cert grants and 
blatant invitations in their opinions, and the Roberts Court has not been 
shy about using either technique. For example, the Court’s review of 
several environmental cases in its 2008–09 term is likely linked to in-
dustry clients “turn[ing] repeatedly to the expert Supreme Court bar for 
assistance.”329 Perhaps more telling, it was no secret that several Justices 
were willing to reconsider a precedent on the constitutionality of manda-
tory public sector union fees. Justice Alito almost explicitly invited such 
a case in his 2013 opinion in Harris v. Quinn, and the complaint in 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association was promptly filed less 
than a year later.330 
Against this backdrop, it is to be expected that the Supreme Court Bar 
would encourage their business clients to pursue cases that the Justices 
both want to hear and want to issue favorable rulings on. Likewise, civil 
rights and liberties interests are likely to hold back on cases that they are 
 
328 Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets, 16 Sup. 
Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 1 (2008); see Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, Judicial Agenda Setting 
Through Signaling and Strategic Litigant Responses, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 215, 217–20 
(2009); Hope Babcock, How the Supreme Court Uses the Certiorari Process in the Ninth 
Circuit to Further Its Pro-Business Agenda: A Strange Pas de Deux with an Unfortunate Co-
da, 41 Ecology L.Q. 653, 666–67 (2014) (using Ninth Circuit environmental decisions to 
illustrate how the Court’s selection of cases signals its preferences and, in so doing, influ-
ences the strategic decision making of lawyers who will shape the dockets of lower courts 
and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court through their selection of cases to bring before lower 
courts). 
329 Lazarus, Docket Capture, supra note 6, at 91; see also Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, su-
pra note 7, at 1532–35 (arguing that the Court’s revitalization of its antitrust docket in 2002 
and its willingness to consider constitutional limits on punitive damages after 1998 were tied 
to the efforts of the Supreme Court Bar).  
330 The 2013 decision Harris v. Quinn was specifically referenced as the critical “signal” 
by the public interest group that filed Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. See 
Friedrichs v. CTA: Why Now?, Ctr. for Individual Rights, https://www.cir-usa.org/cases/f
riedrichs-v-california-teachers-association-et-al/friedrichs-v-cta-why-now [https://perm
a.cc/NC82-2GLB]. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016); Harris v. 
Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618 (2014). The lawyer arguing the case, Mike Carvin, also referred to 
Harris as an important signal that the Court was ready to reconsider the constitutionality of 
public sector union fees. Mike Carvin, Partner, Jones Day, Remarks (Nov. 2, 2015). 
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likely to lose.331 Indeed, our conversations with Supreme Court special-
ists and studies on Supreme Court filings back up both propositions. 
Specialists from the ACLU, Public Citizen, the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, and the Stanford Supreme Court Clinic all said that they assess the 
likelihood of success when deciding whether to pursue or resist cert.332 
These debates are hardly unique to the Roberts Court.333 Civil-rights 
groups have long sought to avoid making “bad law” by screening out 
 
331 Indeed, Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts, and John Shiffman—who criticize how it is that 
pro-business lawyers dominate the docket—recognize that “public interest lawyers effective-
ly influence the court’s agenda, too. They do so by declining to draft petitions for some kinds 
of civil rights and consumer cases.” Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1. 
332 Telephone Interviews with Dale Ho, Dir., Voting Rights Project, ACLU (Nov. 5, 
2015); Steven R. Shapiro, Legal Dir., ACLU (Nov. 18, 2015); Allison M. Zieve, Dir., Public 
Citizen Litig. Grp. (Dec. 18, 2015); Interview with Jeffrey L. Fisher, Professor and Co-Dir., 
Stanford Law Sch. Supreme Court Litig. Clinic, in Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 25, 2015); 
Email Interview with Pamela Karlan, Professor and Co-Dir., Stanford Law Sch. Supreme 
Court Litig. Clinic (Feb. 9, 2016); Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 1 (quoting Scott Nelson, a 
lawyer at Public Citizen, as saying, “You don’t want to go up and make matters worse” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Civil Rights Groups Avoid Taking Cases to Supreme 
Court, Jet, Mar. 22, 1999, at 38, https://books.google.com/books?id=SjsDAAAAMBAJ&l
pg=PA1&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false [https://perma.cc/H48W-LG4K] (quoting Ted 
Shaw, an NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund lawyer, as saying, “There is too much 
at stake to risk pulling down affirmative action nationwide at the hands of a closely divided 
court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Decisions likely impacted by such strategic 
screening include informed consent requirements and abortion (where women were told 
about suicide risks associated with the abortion procedure), disparate impact proofs in fair 
housing litigation, and the decision to pursue marriage equality before the Supreme Court. 
See Email from Dale Ho, Dir., Voting Rights Project, ACLU, to Neal Devins, Sandra Day 
O’Connor Professor of Law, William & Mary Sch. of Law (Nov. 6, 2015, 12:37 PM) (on file 
with authors) (discussing fair housing litigation); Linda Greenhouse, The Illusion of a Liber-
al Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/opinion
/the-illusion-of-a-liberal-supreme-court.html (noting refusal of pro-choice groups to pursue 
abortion appeals); Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal: Is It Too Soon to Petition the Su-
preme Court on Gay Marriage?, New Yorker (Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.newyorker.co
m/magazine/2010/01/18/a-risky-proposal [https://perma.cc/QLC8-DJGM] (discussing the 
strategy behind the decision to bring Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2009), as a challenge to California’s Proposition 8, which overturned a California Supreme 
Court decision to allow same-sex marriage); Howard Mintz, Civil Rights Groups Give Cold 
Shoulder to Federal Lawsuit Challenging Proposition 8, Mercury News (San Jose, Cal.) 
(May 27, 2009), http://www.mercurynews.com/localnewsheadlines/ci_12462665 
[https://perma.cc/KN7T-P8MK] (discussing the LGBTQ-rights community’s hesitance to 
challenge Proposition 8 through Perry v. Schwarzenegger).  333 On the question of whether Supreme Court clinics should engage in screening, see 
Nancy Morawetz, Counterbalancing Distorted Incentives in Supreme Court Pro Bono Prac-
tice: Recommendations for the New Supreme Court Pro Bono Bar and Public Interest Prac-
tice Communities, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 131, 168–71 (2011), (arguing that clinics should de-
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certain cases;334 political scientists studying the Court have observed that 
the Court’s docket is skewed both by screening (where advocates do not 
pursue high-risk cases) and signaling (where advocates pursue cases that 
they think the Court wants to hear).335 
For our purposes, the important point is that the Court’s propensity to 
decide business cases may not be coming at the expense of the individu-
al-rights cases it might hear—litigants for individuals may just not want 
to take their cases up to the Court. Likewise, the business-interest agen-
da at the Bar dates back well before the Roberts Court. Indeed, the ad-
vent of the business-oriented Supreme Court Bar can be traced to a 1971 
appeal by Lewis Powell (before he joined the Court) to the Chamber of 
Commerce, calling on the Chamber and other business interests to fol-
low the model of civil rights and liberties groups by advancing their 
agenda before the Court.336 
We do not deny that the Supreme Court Bar contributes to shaping the 
Court’s business docket. Supreme Court experts who represent business 
interests will look for signals from the Court and advance cases that will 
further their clients’ pro-business agendas. At the same time, just as civil 
rights and liberties interests looked to a receptive Court to advance their 
agenda at an earlier time, it is the Justices—and not the lawyers—who 
are sending the signals and issuing the rulings. In other words, the Bar—
both business and individual interests—is doing what lawyers always 
do: representing clients, seeking favorable rulings, and avoiding cases 
that are likely to produce unfavorable rulings. 
There is a second type of criticism that needs to be addressed—
namely, the worry that lawyers for business interests are better funded 
and more likely to provide high-quality representation than are lawyers 
for individual interests. At the cert stage, there is some—but only 
 
cline to assist rather than make bad law); cf. Fisher, supra note 97, at 191–94 (providing a 
competing, if not contradictory, view). 
334 See Civil Rights Groups Avoid Taking Cases To Supreme Court, supra note 332; Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Avoidance, Wash. Post., Dec. 7, 1997, at C1 (discussing 
civil-rights groups’ efforts to settle an affirmative action dispute after the Supreme Court had 
granted cert).  335 See Baird & Jacobi, supra note 328, at 218–23 (2009); Kevin T. McGuire et al., Meas-
uring Policy Content on the U.S. Supreme Court, 71 J. Pol. 1305, 1308, 1310–11, (2009) 
(discussing the impact of screening on Supreme Court docket). 336 See Rosen, supra note 194, pt. II. Powell thought it imperative that business interests 
counter the growing influence of public interest groups and, correspondingly, recognize that 
the courts “may be the most important instrument for social, economic, and political 
change.” Id. (quoting Powell) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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some—truth to this claim; at the merits stage, we think this worry is 
misplaced. 
At cert, there is an undeniable resource advantage for business inter-
ests. Most elite Supreme Court lawyers work for large law firms with a 
business-oriented client base. These lawyers are likely to spot plausible 
cases early on and invest substantial energy in securing amicus briefs 
and otherwise doing what they can to secure cert.337 
Lawyers representing individual interests may be less inclined to seek 
cert, as the Court is somewhat hostile to their interests.338 It is also the 
case that there are far fewer of these lawyers.339 At the same time, three 
of the top eight Supreme Court specialists (Jeff Fisher, Tom Goldstein, 
and Dave Frederick) regularly represent individual interests. These law-
yers, moreover, are as likely as their business-oriented counterparts to 
seek amicus briefs when petitioning for cert.340 From 2005 to 2015, 
Fisher sought amicus backing in eight of seventeen cases in which he 
represented petitioner; Goldstein sought backing in four of eight cases in 
which he represented petitioner; and Frederick sought backing in six of 
ten cases in which he represented petitioner.341 Moreover, Supreme 
Court clinics were intended to, and have, leveled the playing field in this 
regard. In fact Richard Lazarus predicted this possibility in 2005 when 
he suggested that “any current discrepancy in the allocation of Supreme 
Court expertise” could be temporary and may “correct itself over 
time.”342 
Perhaps more significant, once the Court agrees to hear a case, Su-
preme Court experts are all willing to offer their services either pro bono 
or at a substantially reduced rate.343 “Simply appearing before the top 
 
337 See Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1528–29 (discussing coordinated ami-
cus filings in pro-business cases).  338 See supra notes 316–19 and accompanying text.  339 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 2.  340 No one calls attention to their cases by seeking amicus briefs when opposing cert, and, 
consequently, we did not survey amicus filings in opposition to cert. See Interview with 
Carter Phillips, Partner, Sidley Austin, in Williamsburg, Va. (Feb. 28, 2012).  341 In calculating these numbers, we looked to the Oyez website for a list of cases these 
attorneys had argued as petitioner and used the SCOTUSblog website to find filed cert-stage 
amicus briefs in these cases. If the SCOTUSblog website did not include briefs, we used 
Westlaw.  
342 Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1558. 343 Id. at 1557; Interview with Neal Katyal, Partner, Hogan Lovells, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 
2, 2015). It is interesting to contemplate in this regard whether public-interest organizations 
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court brings with it prestige and publicity that firms believe help them 
recruit new corporate clients and lure the next generation of top attor-
neys.”344 Consequently, when cert is granted and one or both of the law-
yers is not a member of the elite Supreme Court Bar, members of the 
Bar fight hard to take over the case. This includes cases that pit business 
against individual interests. From October Term 2012 to October Term 
2014, “there were only two [cases] in which the non-corporate party liti-
gated the case without obvious, substantial support either from Supreme 
Court counsel (representing the party) or the Solicitor General’s Office 
(as an amicus).”345 Indeed, some regional attorneys have expressed dis-
may at the intense campaigning of top Supreme Court lawyers to take 
over their cases, some even complaining of the aggressiveness of these 
campaigns.346 No doubt, the representation disadvantage that exists at 
the petition stage largely disappears at the merits stage.347 
CONCLUSION 
The days of the regional lawyer making her first and only argument 
before the Supreme Court are largely behind us; today’s Court is domi-
nated by elite repeat players. That shift has made its mark on the amicus 
process. The “friend of the court” brief is no longer just the tool for lob-
 
should systematically be granted discounts or even free printing costs to file briefs at the 
Court. That small change could also address any advocacy asymmetry. 344 Biskupic et al., supra note 7, pt. 2. 345 Tom Goldstein, The Supreme Court Bar as a Tool of Business, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 6, 
2015, 5:35 PM) (emphasis omitted) http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/the-supreme-court-
bar-as-a-tool-of-business [https://perma.cc/54BR-UEYL]. 346 Stephen B. Kinnaird, All Over the High Court, Legal Times (Oct. 6, 2008), 
http://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/1023.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH6Z-
LUXG] (“When such a case [that is likely to be granted cert] is discovered, a ferocious com-
petition ensues. Firms or clinics that discover a circuit conflict a day late are out of luck. The 
target party’s current lawyer is often stunned (and vexed) by the immediate onslaught of 
calls from eager appellate specialists. More than one prominent advocate has been known to 
hop a red-eye to visit a prison, hoping to sign up the inmate whose pro se petition the Court 
just granted.”). Efforts of Supreme Court specialists to take over cases even include efforts to 
take over cases from regional appellate specialists, including state Solicitors General. See 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean, Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of Law, Remarks at William & Mary 
School of Law Supreme Court Preview 2015–16 (Sep. 26, 2015).  
347 Even critics of the concentration of resources in the business-oriented Supreme Court 
Bar recognize that the “advocacy gap” is, to some extent, closed at the merits stage. Lazarus, 
Advocacy Matters, supra note 7, at 1557; see also Interview with Jeffrey L. Fisher, Professor 
and Co-Dir., Stanford Law Sch. Supreme Court Litig. Clinic, in Williamsburg, Va. (Sept. 25, 
2015) (acknowledging that the representation issue is less pronounced at the merits stage and 
more of a concern at cert). 
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byists, organically grown by interest groups hoping to press their policy 
preferences at the Court. There is now an “amicus strategy,” and it is in-
tentional and choreographed by Supreme Court specialists. Although it 
is natural to be skeptical of any cultural shift, this one is—for the most 
part—beneficial, not pernicious. The amicus machine creates a valuable 
reputation market, an important signal for the Court to build its docket, 
and a necessary tool for Justices interested in declaring rules rather than 
just adjudicating disputes. If the amicus boom is going to continue, it is 
better monitored by a set of repeat players and specialists than left to 
grow wildly on its own. 
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APPENDIX348  
We are grateful to the following journalists and members of the Su-
preme Court Bar who generously gave their time and thoughts to us 
about the amicus process: 
Joan Biskupic, Reuters 
Lisa Blatt, Arnold & Porter and former Assistant Solicitor General 
Beth Brinkmann, Civil Division of the Department of Justice, former 
Assistant Solicitor General, and formerly in private practice at Morrison 
& Foerster 
Mike Carvin, Jones Day 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean, University of California, Irvine School of 
Law 
Paul Clement, Bancroft, former Solicitor General 
Walter Dellinger, O’Melveny & Myers and former Acting Solicitor 
General 
Jeff Fisher, Stanford Law School 
Anthony Franze, Arnold & Porter 
Greg Garre, Latham & Watkins and former Solicitor General 
Tom Goldstein, Goldstein & Russell and publisher of SCOTUSblog 
Linda Greenhouse, New York Times and Yale Law School 
Dale Ho, American Civil Liberties Union 
Neal Katyal, Hogan Lovells and former Acting Solicitor General 
Pam Karlan, Stanford Law School, and former assistant counsel, 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
Doug Laycock, University of Virginia School of Law and Supreme 
Court advocate 
Adam Liptak, New York Times 
Jonathan Mitchell, Hoover Institution and former Solicitor General of 
Texas 
Carter Phillips, Sidley Austin and former Assistant Solicitor General 
Andy Pincus, Mayer Brown, Yale Law School, and former Assistant 
Solicitor General 
Charles Rothfeld, Mayer Brown, Yale Law School, and former Assis-
tant Solicitor General 
 
348 We spoke to all of these Supreme Court experts in various forms: most in formal inter-
views, some for background, and some in more casual contexts.  
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Dan Schweitzer, National Association of Attorneys General 
Mike Scodro, Jenner & Block, University of Chicago, and former Il-
linois Solicitor General 
Kannon Shanmugam, Williams & Connolly and former Assistant So-
licitor General 
Steve Shapiro, American Civil Liberties Union 
Paul Smith, Jenner & Block 
Kathleen Sullivan, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan 
Kate Todd, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Allison Zieve, Public Citizen 
 
